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I. INTRODUCTION 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and (d), as well as Supreme Court precedent, 
remand orders in removed cases are immune from appellate review when they 
are based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Until recently, all appellate 
courts that had addressed the issue had concluded that a district court’s 
discretionary decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1367(c) and remand the supplemental claims does not constitute a 
remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore is reviewable on 
appeal.1 
In 2007, however, the Supreme Court held in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant 
Energy Services, Inc.2 that where a district court characterizes a remand as 
subject matter jurisdictional and that characterization is colorable, the remand 
order is not subject to appellate review.3 Although the case did not involve the 
remand of supplemental claims, the Court stated the following in dictum: “It is 
far from clear . . . that when discretionary supplemental jurisdiction is declined 
the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for purposes of § 
1447(c) and § 1447(d).”4 
Then, in HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co.,5 the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, relying on Powerex, 
became the first circuit to hold that Cohill remands6 fall within § 1447(c) and (d) 
 
1. See infra Part II.D.1 for a discussion of appellate courts’ remands of supplemental claims prior 
to the Powerex decision. 
2. 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007). 
3. Id. at 2418. 
4. Id. at 2418–19. 
5. 508 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 
S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437). 
6. A remand that occurs after a district court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 
§ 1367(c) is often referred to as a “remand under § 1367(c),” or a “§ 1367(c) remand.” These remands 
are also referred to as “Cohill remands” because the Supreme Court held in Carnegie-Mellon 
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and therefore are not subject to appellate review.7 The HIF Bio court reasoned 
that “because every § 1367(c) remand necessarily involves a predicate finding 
that the claims at issue lack an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, a 
remand based on declining supplemental jurisdiction can be colorably 
characterized as a remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”8 On 
October 14, 2008, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in HIF Bio to resolve 
the circuit split created by the Federal Circuit.9 
This Article examines whether the HIF Bio decision was correct and 
ultimately concludes that it was not. Part II reviews the history of supplemental 
jurisdiction and § 1447(c) and (d). Part II also explains the relationship between 
§ 1447(c) and (d) and explicates the pertinent Supreme Court and court of 
appeals precedent. Part III.A begins by explaining how some postremoval events 
can lead to remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the current 
version of § 1447(c). Part III.B then argues that a district court’s decision to 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is not the type of postremoval event 
that results in a jurisdictional defect and thereby renders Cohill remands 
unreviewable on appeal. More specifically, Part III.B contends that the HIF Bio 
court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal in that case 
for two reasons. First, the Federal Circuit misunderstood the language of § 1367 
and confused the existence of judicial power with the discretionary decision 
whether to exercise such power. Second, the Federal Circuit incorrectly applied 
the Powerex test to the remand order in HIF Bio. Part III.B concludes that the 
Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and hold that the Federal 
Circuit must review the remand order on the merits. 
Part III.C argues that even if the Supreme Court determines that Cohill 
remands are remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, that does not 
 
University v. Cohill that district courts could remand pendent claims in removed cases instead of 
dismiss them. 484 U.S. 343, 354 (1988). See also infra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of the Cohill decision. 
At the time Cohill was decided, there was no statutory basis for the remand of pendent claims. 
Instead, the power to remand derived from the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 
356. When the supplemental jurisdiction statute was enacted, it did not (and still does not) provide for 
the remand or dismissal of supplemental claims once a district court declines to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over them. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, there is no question 
that the supplemental jurisdiction statute applies to removed cases and district courts can remand 
supplemental claims in removed cases if they decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. 
See infra note 41 and accompanying text. Because the district court’s remand authority does not derive 
from § 1367, it (presumably) continues to derive from Cohill. Thus, this Article refers to the remand of 
claims after a district court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as Cohill remands. 
7. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667. 
8. Id. 
9. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437). The Petition 
for Certiorari phrased the question presented as follows: 
Whether a district court’s order remanding a case to state court following its discretionary 
decision to decline to exercise the supplemental jurisdiction accorded to federal courts under 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) is properly held to be a remand for a “lack of subject matter jurisdiction” 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) so that such remand order is barred from any appellate review by 
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 
Id.  
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automatically mean that they fall within § 1447(c) and are unreviewable under § 
1447(d). Finally, Part III.D explores the consequences that will result if the 
Court (erroneously) concludes both that Cohill remands are based on a lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction and that they are immune from appellate review 
under § 1447(c) and (d). 
II. BACKGROUND OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION AND § 1447(C) AND (D) 
A. Supplemental Jurisdiction 
1. History 
The history of supplemental jurisdiction is well documented10 and is 
recounted only in relevant part here. In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 
which codifies the common law doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction 
under the label of supplemental jurisdiction.11 Pursuant to these doctrines, if a 
district court had an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction over at least 
one claim, then the jurisdictional statutes12 “implicitly authorized supplemental 
jurisdiction over all other claims between the same parties arising out of the 
same Article III case or controversy.”13 The “leading modern case for this 
principle”14 is United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs.15 
 
10. See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552–57 (2005) (discussing 
previous Supreme Court cases dealing with supplemental jurisdiction); see also id. at 579–84 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (outlining prior Supreme Court holdings regarding supplemental 
jurisdiction); Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute—A Constitutional 
and Statutory Analysis, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849, 852–89 (1992) (discussing Federal Courts Study 
Committee and prior case law which led to supplemental jurisdiction statute); John B. Oakley, Recent 
Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements Acts of 
1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735, 757–63 (1991) (discussing doctrines in place preceding 
supplemental jurisdiction statute); James E. Pfander, Supplemental Jurisdiction and Section 1367: The 
Case for a Sympathetic Textualism, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 109, 116–20 (1999) (discussing origins of 
supplemental jurisdiction). 
11. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164–65 (1997). Pendent jurisdiction 
“applied only in federal-question cases and allowed plaintiffs to attach nonfederal claims to their 
jurisdiction-qualifying claims.” Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 590–91 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In 
contrast, ancillary jurisdiction “applied primarily, although not exclusively, in diversity cases and 
typically involved claims by a defending party haled into court against his will.” Id. at 591 (internal 
quotation marks and alterations in original omitted). Thus, prior to the enactment of the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute, courts regularly exercised ancillary jurisdiction “over compulsory counterclaims, 
impleader claims, cross-claims among defendants, and claims of parties who intervened of right.” Id. at 
581 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
12. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); id. § 1332(a)(1) (“The 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy 
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—(1) citizens of 
different States. . . .”). 
13. Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 556 (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 
715, 725 (1966)) (emphasis added); see also id. at 554 (“In order for a federal court to invoke 
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In Gibbs, a pendent jurisdiction case, the plaintiff filed an action in federal 
court alleging violations of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) 
and state law against the defendant.16 The district court had federal question 
jurisdiction over the LMRA claims17 but lacked diversity jurisdiction over the 
state claim.18 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the district court had 
the “power” to hear the whole case because the district court had an 
independent basis of jurisdiction over the federal claim and the state and federal 
claims were sufficiently related.19 The Gibbs Court emphasized, however, that 
“pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right. Its 
justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness 
to litigants; if these are not present a federal court should hesitate to exercise 
jurisdiction over state claims.”20 Thus, although the district court may have the 
power to hear both the federal and state claims, “[t]hat power need not be 
exercised in every case in which it is found to exist.”21 
 
supplemental jurisdiction under Gibbs, it must first have original jurisdiction over at least one claim in 
the action.”). 
14. Id. at 552. 
15. 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
16. Gibbs, 383 U.S at 717–18. 
17. See id. at 717, 728 (stating that claims against defendant under § 303 of LMRA “generally 
were substantial”). 
18. Id. at 720, 722 (stating that jurisdiction over state law claim was based on doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction and that diversity jurisdiction over state claim was absent). 
19. See id. at 728 (“[T]he state and federal claims arose from the same nucleus of operative fact 
and reflected alternative remedies.”); id. at 725 (stating that if federal claim has “substance sufficient 
to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court” and “state and federal claims . . . derive from a 
common nucleus of operative fact,” then “there is power in [the] federal courts to hear the whole” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
20. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. The Gibbs Court gave several examples of when a district court 
should or could decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction. Id. First, a district court should avoid 
“[n]eedless decisions of state law . . . both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the 
parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law.” Id. Second, “if the federal 
claims [were] dismissed before trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state 
claims should be dismissed as well.” Id. Third, “if it appear[ed] that the state issues substantially 
predominate[d] . . . the state claims [could] be dismissed without prejudice.” Id. Finally, a district court 
could decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction if there were “reasons independent of jurisdictional 
considerations, such as the likelihood of jury confusion in treating divergent legal theories of relief, 
that . . . justif[ied] separating state and federal claims for trial.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 727. Although the 
language used by the Gibbs Court “strongly suggested” that the district court should always dismiss 
the state law claims “if the federal claim was dismissed before trial, many courts treated this 
circumstance as simply one element to be considered in making the ultimate discretionary decision.” 
JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 75 (4th ed. 2005) (footnote omitted); see also 
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403–05 (1970) (holding that jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law 
claims continues even after plaintiff’s federal claim becomes moot). See infra notes 203, 230 for a 
discussion of district courts’ exercise of pendent jurisdiction in these situations. 
21. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; see also id. at 727 (“The question of power will ordinarily be resolved 
on the pleadings. But the issue whether pendent jurisdiction has been properly assumed is one which 
remains open throughout the litigation.” (emphasis added)); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 
Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552–53 (2005) (“Gibbs confirmed that the District Court had the additional power 
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After the decision in Gibbs, the Court took issue with the common law 
nature of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction and the failure of the Gibbs Court to 
“mention, let alone come to grips with . . . the bedrock principle that federal 
courts have no jurisdiction without statutory authorization.”22 Although the 
Court reaffirmed Gibbs and the exercise of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction 
over claims between the same parties where at least one claim had an 
independent basis of jurisdiction, the Court refused to extend Gibbs and 
interpret the jurisdictional statutes to “authorize supplemental jurisdiction over 
additional claims involving other parties.”23 
For example, in Finley v. United States,24 the Court refused to permit the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction where the plaintiff asserted a federal claim 
against one defendant and state law claims against the other defendants.25 The 
federal claim had its own basis of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), but the 
state law claims did not fall within the district court’s diversity jurisdiction and no 
statute explicitly provided for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over 
them.26 Because there was no specific statutory authorization for the district 
court to assert jurisdiction over the state law claims, the Finley Court held that 
the lower court did not have power to hear them.27 
In reaching its decision, the Finley Court noted that Congress could change 
the result in Finley by passing a statute that authorized the exercise of 
supplemental jurisdiction over claims by and against parties joined to an action 
that did not have an independent basis of jurisdiction.28 Congress responded by 
enacting § 1367.29 The statute does “not acknowledge any distinction between 
 
(though not the obligation) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims that arose 
from the same Article III case or controversy.”). 
22. Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 553 (citing Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 548 (1989)). 
23. Id. at 557 (citing Finley, 490 U.S. at 549, 556; Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300–01 
(1973); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 590 (1939)). 
24. 490 U.S. 545 (1989). 
25. Finley, 490 U.S. at 546, 555. 
26. Id. at 547–55. 
27. Id. at 555. 
28. Id. at 556. 
29. This statute provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by 
Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the 
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution. Such supplemental 
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties. 
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded solely on 
section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under 
subsection (a) over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 
24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed to be joined 
as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 
of such rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be 
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332. 
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 
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pendent . . . and . . . ancillary jurisdiction.”30 Section 1367(a) provides that unless 
another federal statute or subsection (b) or (c) applies, when a federal court has 
“original jurisdiction” over at least one claim in an action, it “shall have” 
supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims that are part of the same Article 
III case or controversy but do not by themselves fall within the court’s original 
jurisdiction.31 Section 1367(a) also overrules the result in Finley by providing that 
supplemental jurisdiction “include[s] claims that involve the joinder or 
intervention of additional parties.”32 Section 1367(b) “qualifies the broad rule of 
§ 1367(a)” by creating specific exceptions to § 1367(a).33 
In addition, supplemental jurisdiction, “‘is a doctrine of discretion, not of 
plaintiff’s right.’”34 Section 1367(c) “confirms the discretionary nature of 
supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the circumstances in which district 
courts can refuse its exercise.”35 Specifically, § 1367(c) provides that “district 
courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under 
subsection (a)” where 
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim 
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the 
 
subsection (a) if—(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim 
substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original 
jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 
declining jurisdiction. 
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other 
claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the 
dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for 
a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period. 
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States. 
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006). 
30. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 559 (2005); see also id. (“Though 
the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction developed separately as a historical matter, the 
Court has recognized that the doctrines are ‘two species of the same generic problem.’” (quoting 
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370 (1978))). 
31. Id. at 558–59; see also City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 167 (1997) 
(“The whole point of supplemental jurisdiction is to allow the district courts to exercise . . . jurisdiction 
over claims as to which original jurisdiction is lacking.”). 
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 558 (noting that holding in 
Finley was overturned by § 1367). 
33. Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. at 560. Section 1367(b) applies only to diversity cases and to 
those claims over which there is no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction. It “withholds 
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of plaintiffs proposed to be joined as indispensable parties 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, or who seek to intervene pursuant to Rule 24,” and 
“explicitly excludes supplemental jurisdiction over claims against defendants joined under” Rules 14, 
19, 20, and 24. Id.; see also id. at 593 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “§ 1367(b) stops plaintiffs 
from circumventing § 1332’s jurisdictional requirements by using another’s claim as a hook to add a 
claim that the plaintiff could not have brought in the first instance”). 
34. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172 (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 
U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). 
35. Id. at 173. 
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district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has 
dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in 
exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 
declining jurisdiction.36 
According to the Supreme Court, § 1367(c) “reflects the understanding that, 
when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court 
should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the 
values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”37 
2. Supplemental Jurisdiction and Removal 
The general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), provides that defendants 
may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts 
of the United States have original jurisdiction.”38 Accordingly, removal is proper 
only if the entire case “originally could have been filed in federal court.”39 
Although the text of the supplemental jurisdiction statute does not indicate 
whether it applies to removed cases, the Supreme Court has said that § 1367 
“applies with equal force to cases removed to federal court as to cases initially 
filed there.”40 Thus, taking sections 1367 and 1441(a) together, when an action is 
removed the district court must have an independent basis of subject matter 
jurisdiction over at least one claim, and any claims that lack an independent basis 
of subject matter jurisdiction must fall within the court’s supplemental 
jurisdiction under § 1367(a).41 In addition, although neither § 1367 nor any other 
 
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); see also Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 173 (stating that courts may 
opt against invoking supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims based on several factors, including 
specific circumstances of case, type of claims available under state law, characteristics of state law, and 
correlation between state and federal law claims). 
37. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 173 (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 
343, 350 (1988)). 
 38.  28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).  
39. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 163; see, e.g., Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 
28, 33 (2002) (stating that defendants must demonstrate original subject matter jurisdiction for proper 
removal to federal court); Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Graham, 489 U.S. 838, 840 (1989) (per curiam) 
(noting that removal to federal court is not proper unless case could have been brought there 
originally). 
40. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 165; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
545 U.S. 546, 591 n.11 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“There was no disagreement in [International 
College of Surgeons], and there is none now, that . . . § 1367(a) is properly read to authorize the 
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in removed cases.”). 
41. It is important to distinguish between supplemental claims that fall within § 1367(a) and are 
removable pursuant to § 1441(a) and claims that are removable pursuant to § 1441(c). To fall within § 
1367(a), of course, a claim without an independent basis of jurisdiction must be part of the same 
Article III case or controversy as a claim with an independent basis of jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) 
(“[T]he district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.”). If these requirements are satisfied 
and § 1367(b) does not withdraw jurisdiction over the supplemental claim, then the case is removable 
under § 1441(a) because it could have been filed in federal court originally. 
 In contrast, § 1441(c) provides for the removal of “otherwise non-removable claims or causes of 
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statute explicitly authorizes the remand of supplemental claims, there is no 
question that district courts may remand state law claims if they decline to 
exercise their supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c).42 
B. § 1447(c) and (d) 
1. Statutory History 
Like the history of supplemental jurisdiction, the history of § 1447(c) and 
(d) is well documented43 and is recounted here in pertinent part only. Congress 
first created the right of removal in the Judiciary Act of 1789,44 and it has existed 
ever since.45 In contrast, although lower courts have always remanded cases 
when they lacked subject matter jurisdiction,46 it was not until 1875 that 
 
action” that are joined with “a separate and independent claim or cause of action” that falls within 
§1331. Id. § 1441(c). As Professor Dodson has pointed out, “[t]here is no comparable statutory 
authorization of original jurisdiction because supplemental jurisdiction applies only to claims that are 
not separate and independent.” Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
55, 62 (2008). Thus, unlike § 1441(a), § 1441(c) permits the removal of “case[s] that could not have 
been heard in federal court originally.” Id. Furthermore, as many scholars have suggested, “[§] 1441(c) 
may be unconstitutional if it permits the removal of claims that bear no relation to any federal 
question and that are between nondiverse defendants.” FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 66 & 
n.49; see also Joan Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdiction in § 1441 Removed Cases: An Unsurveyed 
Frontier of Congress’ Handiwork, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 321–25 (1993) (discussing relationship 
between § 1367 and § 1441(c)). 
42. See Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172–74 (indicating that district courts are not required 
to hear state law claims). 
43. E.g., Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343–50 (1976), overruled in part 
by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714–15 (1996); Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 
1249, 1254–60 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1447(d) does not bar appellate review of case which has 
been removed on grounds not authorized by § 1447(c)); Joan Steinman, Postremoval Changes in the 
Party Structure of Diversity Cases: The Old Law, the New Law, and Rule 19, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 863, 
887–93 (1990) (discussing history of removal and remand statutes); Rhonda Wasserman, Rethinking 
Review of Remands: Proposed Amendments to the Federal Removal Statute, 43 EMORY L.J. 83, 87–
108 (1994) (discussing history of statutory bar on appellate review of remand orders); David D. Siegel, 
Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1447, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (2006) (noting changes to removal 
statute). 
44. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79–80 (repealed 1911) (authorizing removal “if a 
suit [were] commenced in any state court against an alien, or by a citizen of the state in which the suit 
is brought against a citizen of another state, and the matter in dispute exceeds the . . . sum or value of 
five hundred dollars, exclusive of costs”). 
45. Joan Steinman, Removal, Remand, and Review in Pendent Claim and Pendent Party Cases, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 923, 926 (1988) (citing 1A J. MOORE & B. RINGLE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 
0.156[1], at 13–14 (2d ed. 1987)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided 
by . . . Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts . . . have original 
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court . . . for the 
district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.”). 
46. Wasserman, supra note 43, at 89–90 (stating that although Judiciary Act of 1789 did not 
specifically authorize remands, circuit courts of time remanded cases due to lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction or because of defendant’s failure to comply with statutory removal procedures). 
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Congress expressly authorized remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.47 
Congress did not prohibit appellate review of remand orders until 1887.48 
 
47. Id. at 90, 92; Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(c) (2006)) (“[I]f, in any suit . . . removed . . . to a circuit court . . . it shall appear to the satisfaction 
of said circuit court, at any time after such suit has been . . . removed thereto, that such suit does not 
really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit 
court . . . , the said circuit court shall proceed no further therein, but shall . . . remand it to the court 
from which it was removed as justice may require . . . .”). 
48. Wasserman, supra note 43, at 100; Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553 (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)) (“Whenever any cause shall be removed . . . , and the circuit court shall 
decide that the cause was improperly removed, and order the same to be remanded . . . , such remand 
shall be immediately carried into execution, and no appeal or writ of error from the decision . . . so 
remanding such cause shall be allowed.”). A few years after this provision was enacted, the Supreme 
Court held that it “precluded review of remand orders not only by writ of error and appeal, but also by 
writ of mandamus.” Wasserman, supra note 43, at 102–03 (citing Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 
U.S. 556, 582 (1896); In re Pa. Co., 137 U.S. 451, 454 (1890)). 
 Interestingly, although the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not specifically authorize appellate review of 
remand orders, until 1875 “the Supreme Court reviewed remand orders entered by the circuit courts 
on writs of error or appeal” without statutory authorization. Id. at 90 (footnotes omitted). In 1875, 
when Congress authorized remand of actions for lack of jurisdiction, it also provided for appellate 
review of remand orders. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c)) (“[T]he order of [a] circuit court . . . remanding [a] cause to . . . State court shall be 
reviewable by the Supreme Court on writ of error or appeal . . . .”). According to Professor 
Wasserman, no legislative history for the appellate review provision has been found and therefore the 
reasons for its enactment are unclear. Wasserman, supra note 43, at 92. 
 Professor Wasserman has noted, however, that Congress expanded the removal jurisdiction of the 
circuit courts in 1875 by authorizing the removal of federal question cases. Id. (discussing Act of Mar. 
3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71). She has suggested that Congress added the appellate review 
provision to the removal statutes because “once Congress granted the federal courts removal 
jurisdiction of federal question cases, [it] wanted to ensure that any decisions that the circuit courts 
made interpreting the scope of federal question jurisdiction would be subject to review by the 
Supreme Court.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Professor Wasserman has also suggested that another, “less 
likely” possibility is that “Congress may have enacted [the appellate review] section to legislatively 
overrule” a recent Supreme Court case which “had held that a circuit court order remanding a 
removed action to state court was not a final order from which a writ of error would lie.” Id. at 93 
(discussing Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiswall, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 507 (1875)). 
 In addition to expanding the removal jurisdiction of the circuit courts in 1875, Congress also 
significantly expanded the original jurisdiction of the circuit courts. See id. at 91–92 (citing Act of Mar. 
3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470). The enlargement of the circuit courts’ original and removal 
jurisdiction resulted in docket congestion in both the circuit courts and the Supreme Court. 
Wasserman, supra note 43, at 94–96. Thus, in 1887, Congress reversed direction and restricted the 
scope of the circuit courts’ original and removal jurisdiction. Id. at 99–100 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1887, 
ch. 373, §§ 1, 6, 24 Stat. 552, 552–53, 555). Congress also “repealed the provision authorizing appellate 
review of remand orders” and, for the first time, prohibited review of remand orders by appeal or writ 
of error. Id. at 100 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, §§ 1, 6, 24 Stat. 552, 553, 555). 
 The precise reasons for the inclusion of the ban on appellate review in the 1887 statute are 
uncertain. Id. (stating that “[n]o legislative history exists to explain why the Senate included this 
provision” in bill that Congress eventually passed). At the time, however, the Supreme Court—rather 
than an intermediate appellate court—heard appeals from remand orders. Id. at 90 n.28 (citing 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 13, 22, 1 Stat. 73, 81, 84 for proposition that “[t]he Supreme Court had 
appellate jurisdiction to review ‘final judgments and decrees’ of the circuit courts”). Thus, the “most 
likely” explanation is that “Congress . . . wanted to relieve the Supreme Court’s overload directly, not 
merely indirectly, by reducing the circuit courts’ docket.” Wasserman, supra note 43, at 101. 
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Congress enacted the precursors to the current versions of § 1447(c) and (d) 
in 1948 and 1949, respectively.49 The 1948 version of § 1447(c), which until 1949 
was codified at subsection (e), provided for remand where a case was “removed 
improvidently and without jurisdiction.”50 In 1988, Congress deleted 
“improvident” removal as a basis for remand under § 1447(c) and provided 
instead that “[a] motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal 
procedure must be made within 30 days after . . . removal.”51 The 1988 
amendment also required remand “[i]f at any time before final judgment it 
appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”52 Congress last 
amended § 1447(c) in 1996,53 and the statute currently states in pertinent part: 
“A motion to remand . . . on the basis of any defect other than lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction must be made within 30 days after . . . removal . . . . If at any 
time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”54 Legislative history indicates, and 
lower courts have concluded, that the primary purpose of the 1988 and 1996 
amendments to § 1447(c) was to limit the amount of time a plaintiff had to file a 
remand motion on any basis other than for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.55 
 
 Professor Wasserman also has suggested two other possible explanations for the enactment of the 
ban on appellate review of remand orders. First, “Congress may have withdrawn appellate jurisdiction 
over remand orders to eliminate one of the most powerful weapons in the corporate arsenal: the 
ability of a corporation to exhaust a plaintiff’s resources or stamina by appealing a remand order to 
the Supreme Court in distant Washington, D.C.” Id. Second, the appellate bar was in the same 
paragraph of the statute that authorized remand “if some defendants would not face prejudice [in state 
court] or if the plaintiff’s affidavit alleging local prejudice [in state court] was not well-founded.” Id. 
Thus, Congress may have intended to help relieve the Supreme Court’s docket congestion by limiting 
appellate review only in this narrow class of cases where “if the circuit court erred in remanding . . . , 
the parties opposing remand would face little prejudice.” Id. 
49. In 1948, Congress revised the Judicial Code and “consolidated and recodified” the removal 
statutes. Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 
646, 62 Stat. 939 (1948)). The legislation, however, was replete with drafting errors. Wasserman, supra 
note 43, at 103 n.86. For example, Congress inadvertently omitted the provision barring appellate 
review of remand orders. Id. at 103 & n.86. In order to correct its mistakes, including its omission of 
the prohibition on appellate review of remand orders, Congress again amended the removal provisions 
in 1949. Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1254; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 89, 102 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(d)). The legislative history of the 1949 Act indicates that the new § 1447(d) was added 
“to remove any doubt that the former law as to the finality of an order to remand to a State court is 
continued.” H.R. REP. NO. 81-352, at 15 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1248, 1268. 
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (Supp. III 1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). 
51. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, Title X, § 
1016(c), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)) (emphasis added). 
52. Id. (emphasis added). 
53. United States District Court: Removal Procedure, Pub. L. No. 104-219, 110 Stat. 3022 (1996). 
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (emphasis added). 
55. While the 1948 version of § 1447(c) joined the bases for remand—improvident removal and 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction—with the conjunction “and,” the 1988 version explicitly provided 
for two separate bases of remand: defects in removal procedure and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1254 n.7, 1256 n.12 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that 1988 
amendment to § 1447(c) ratified lower courts’ understanding that Congress intended phrase 
“improvidently and without jurisdiction” in 1948 statute to be read in disjunctive). The 1988 
amendment also made explicit the lower courts’ understanding that Congress intended remand based 
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The 1949 version of § 1447(d) read: “An order remanding a case . . . is not 
reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”56 Congress amended § 1447(d) once in 1964 
to permit appellate review of remand orders in civil rights cases,57 but otherwise 
has left § 1447(d) alone. The current version of the statute provides: “An order 
remanding a case . . . is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an 
order remanding a case . . . pursuant to section 1443 [(the removal provision for 
civil rights cases)] . . . shall be reviewable by appeal or otherwise.”58 According 
to the Supreme Court, the purpose of § 1447(d)’s ban on appellate review of 
remand orders is to prevent the delay caused by “protracted litigation of 
jurisdictional issues.”59 
 
on “improvident” removal to mean remand based on defects in removal procedure. Id. at 1254–56. 
Thus, the “primary change” effected by the 1988 amendment “was the imposition of the 30-day 
limitation on raising motions to remand based on procedural defects.” Id. at 1256 n.13. 
 Congress apparently believed that the 1988 revision to § 1447(c) was ambiguous and had caused 
confusion in the lower courts. H.R. REP. NO. 104-799, at 1–2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3417, 3417–18. Thus, according to the House Report that accompanied the 1996 amendment, § 1447(c) 
was amended to “clarif[y] . . . the intent of Congress that [the] 30-day limit applies to any ‘defect’ other 
than the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id.; see also Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage 
Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 156 n.8 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that 1988 and 1996 amendments to § 1447(c) 
“focused on creating and clarifying time limits concerning when a plaintiff can seek a remand 
following removal from state court”). 
56. Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 84, 63 Stat. 89, 102 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)). 
57. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title IX, § 901, 78 Stat. 241, 266. The 
amendment apparently “was designed to ensure that defendants in civil rights cases would have access 
to a federal forum, even if the district court erroneously remanded the suit to state court, and to 
ensure the development of a uniform federal law regarding civil rights removal jurisdiction.” 
Wasserman, supra note 43, at 105 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 105–06 (stating that Congress 
members’ discussion of 1964 amendment to § 1447(d) centered on providing civil rights defendants 
with federal forum and protecting them from “hostile state courts”). 
 Congress has also expressly granted the United States the right to appeal remand orders in cases 
involving the property of Native Americans, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 487(d) (2006), and has granted both the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Resolution Trust Corporation (“RTC”) the 
right to appeal remand orders, 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(C) (2006) (granting FDIC right to appeal); 12 
U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(3)(C) (giving appeal rights to RTC). Most recently, Congress has granted appellate 
courts authority to review district court orders granting or denying remand motions in cases removed 
under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) as long as the notice of appeal is filed within the 
proper timeframe. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1); see also Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(stating that purpose of § 1453(c)(1) “‘is to develop a body of appellate law interpreting [CAFA] 
without unduly delaying the litigation of class actions’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 49 (2005), 
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 46)). 
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 
59. Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976) (citing United States v. 
Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946)), overruled in part by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 
714–15 (1996); see also Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2007) 
(stating that policy behind § 1447(d) is “avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold nonmerits 
questions”); Wasserman, supra note 43, at 130–40 (arguing that § 1447(d) does not serve purposes that 
historically were or currently are attributed to it); Wasserman, supra note 43, at 139–40, 150 (arguing 
that potential benefits of § 1447(d) do not serve as justification for bar on review of remand orders). 
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2. The Relationship Between § 1447(c) and (d): Thermtron Products,  Inc. 
v. Hermansdorfer 
Although the plain language of § 1447(d) appears to immunize all remand 
orders (except those in civil rights cases) from appellate review, the Supreme 
Court has rejected such an interpretation of the statute.60 In Thermtron 
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,61 the district court remanded a case because its 
docket was congested, the case could not be tried in the near future, and the 
plaintiffs had a “right to a forum of their choice and . . . to a speedy decision on 
the merits.”62 The defendants petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a writ of 
mandamus or prohibition, but the court denied the petition after concluding that, 
under § 1447(d), it “had no jurisdiction to review [the remand] order or to issue 
mandamus.”63 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that § 1447(c) and (d) “must 
be construed together.”64 This meant “that only remand orders issued under § 
1447(c) and invoking the grounds specified therein . . . [were] immune from 
review under § 1447(d).”65 Because the district court had not remanded the case 
on a § 1447(c) ground66 but instead had remanded “a properly removed case on 
grounds that [it] had no authority to consider,” § 1447(d) did not apply and the 
remand order was reviewable on appeal.67 In reaching its conclusion, the Court 
not only interpreted § 1447(d) to bar appellate review of § 1447(c) remands, but 
also indicated that district courts had the power to issue remand orders only on 
the grounds specified in § 1447(c) and that remands on any other ground were 
impermissible.68 
 
60. Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 337–53. In a case decided before Thermtron, the Supreme 
Court held that where a district court dismisses a third-party claim and then remands the case for lack 
of jurisdiction, the order of dismissal is reviewable on appeal because it precedes the remand order “in 
logic and in fact.” Waco v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 293 U.S. 140, 142–44 (1934); see also Wasserman, 
supra note 43, at 112 (arguing that Waco Court did not create exception to bar on appellate review of 
remand orders, but did recognize review of merits decisions preceding remand orders). 
61. 423 U.S. 336 (1976), overruled in part by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 714–
15 (1996).  
62. Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 339–41. 
63. Id. at 341–42. 
64. Id. at 345. 
65. Id. at 346. The Court further held that a § 1447(c) remand order is immune from appellate 
review regardless of “whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate court.” Id. 
at 351; see also Gravitt v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 430 U.S. 723, 723–24 (1977) (per curiam) (holding § 
1447(c) remand immune from appellate review). 
66. Because Thermtron is a 1976 decision, it was decided under the 1948 version of § 1447(c). 
Thus, the Thermtron Court’s conclusion that the case was not remanded under § 1447(c) meant that 
the case had not been “removed improvidently and without jurisdiction.” Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 
U.S. at 342, 351–52. 
67. Id. at 351–52; see also id. at 344 (stating that district court’s basis for remand was “plainly 
irrelevant to whether [it] would have had jurisdiction of the case had it been filed initially in that court, 
to the removability of a case from the state court under § 1441, and hence to the question whether 
[the] cause was [improperly] removed [under § 1447(c)]”). 
68. Id. at 352 (“[T]his Court has not yet construed [§ 1447(d)] so as to extinguish the power of an 
appellate court to correct a district court that has not merely erred in applying the requisite provision 
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Although the Court decided Thermtron under the 1948 version of § 1447(c) 
and that statute has been amended twice since the Thermtron decision, the Court 
has never indicated that the amendments affected Thermtron’s holding that § 
1447(c) and (d) must be read together. Indeed, since Thermtron the Court has 
stated repeatedly (most recently in 2007) that only § 1447(c) remands are 
immune from appellate review under § 1447(d).69 In contrast, however, the 
Court’s suggestion in Thermtron that district courts have authority to remand 
only on the grounds set forth in § 1447(c) has not withstood the test of time. 
 
for remand but has remanded a case on grounds not specified in [§ 1447(c)] and not touching the 
propriety of the removal.”); see also id. at 351 (“[W]e are not convinced that Congress ever intended 
to extend carte blanche authority to the district courts to revise the federal statutes governing removal 
by remanding cases on grounds that seem justifiable to them but which are not recognized by 
[§1447(c)].”). 
 The Thermtron Court also held that because “an order remanding a removed action does not 
represent a final judgment” that is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, “the writ of mandamus is an 
appropriate remedy to require the District Court to entertain [a] remanded action.” Thermtron Prods., 
Inc., 423 U.S. at 352–53. The Court later disavowed this holding in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
517 U.S. 706, 714–15 (1996). See infra note 90 for a discussion of the Quackenbush opinion. 
69. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2007); Osborn v. 
Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 240 (2007); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 640 (2006); 
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 711–12; Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995). 
 In Powerex Corp., the Court addressed the question of how the 1988 and 1996 amendments to § 
1447(c) affected Thermtron’s gloss on the statute. 127 S. Ct. at 2415–16. The Court recognized that 
under Thermtron, the application of § 1447(d) was limited to remands where a case had been removed 
“improvidently and without jurisdiction.” Id. at 2415. The Court also recognized that when the 1988 
version of § 1447(c) was in effect, it had “interpreted § 1447(d) to preclude review only of remands for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for defects in removal procedure.” Id. at 2416 (citing 
Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 711–12; Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 127–28). The Court then 
stated: “Although § 1447(c) was amended . . . again in 1996, we will assume . . . that the amendment 
was immaterial to Thermtron’s gloss on § 1447(d), so that the prohibition on appellate review remains 
limited to remands [for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for defects in removal procedure]” 
under § 1447(c). Id. 
 The Thermtron decision, of course, has not been without its critics. Justice Rehnquist dissented in 
Thermtron primarily on the ground that the plain language of § 1447(d) bars appellate review of all 
remand orders, including the one at issue in Thermtron, except those issued in cases removed under § 
1443. He argued that “characterizing the bar to review [in § 1447(d)] as limited to only those remand 
orders entered pursuant to . . . § 1447(c)” ignored the purpose behind § 1447(d), Thermtron Prods., 
Inc., 423 U.S. at 355–56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), which is “to prevent the additional delay which a 
removing party may achieve by seeking appellate reconsideration of an order of remand,” id. at 354. 
Scholars have also criticized Thermtron. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 43, at 115–19 (suggesting that 
Thermtron Court manipulated precedent to reach its conclusion that § 1447(d) applies only to remands 
under § 1447(c), arguing that Thermtron Court created “test for reviewability of remand orders” that 
is problematic for lower courts to apply, and contending that Thermtron is difficult to square with 
Supreme Court’s later decision in Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988)). 
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C. The Supreme Court and Remand of Supplemental  Claims 
1. Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill 
In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,70 the Supreme Court held that 
district courts, once the anchor claim on which federal question jurisdiction was 
based has been eliminated, can exercise their discretion to remand pendent state 
law claims if they could have dismissed the claims under the same 
circumstances.71 This conclusion appeared to be irreconcilable with Thermtron 
because nothing in the language of § 1447(c) indicated that district courts had the 
power to remand supplemental claims instead of dismissing them.72 
The Court, however, distinguished Thermtron on the ground that it 
involved “a clearly impermissible remand” since the district court had 
jurisdiction over the case and had no authority to refuse to exercise its 
jurisdiction due to a crowded docket.73 In contrast, the Cohill case involved 
pendent state law claims and the district court had “undoubted discretion” to 
decline to hear them under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction set forth in 
Gibbs.74 The only question was whether the district court could decline to 
exercise its pendent jurisdiction by remanding the state law claims instead of 
dismissing them, and the Cohill Court concluded that it could.75 The Court 
reasoned that “[t]he discretion to remand enables district courts to deal with 
cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of 
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent 
jurisdiction doctrine.”76 
Of particular importance here, the Court emphasized in a footnote that the 
remand power it had recognized did not derive from § 1447(c), but instead 
“derive[d] from the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction and applie[d] only to cases 
involving pendent claims.”77 Thus, according to the Court, “the remand 
authority conferred by [§ 1447(c)] and the remand authority conferred by the 
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction overlap not at all.”78 
 
70. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
71. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 354. 
72. As one court cleverly explained: “Thermtron h[eld] that § 1447(d) does not mean what it says 
. . . . [t]hen . . . [Cohill] held that Thermtron does not mean what it says.” In re Amoco Petroleum 
Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 1992). 
73. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 355–56. 
74. Id. at 356 (“[A]n entirely different situation is presented when the district court has clear 
power to decline to exercise jurisdiction. Thermtron therefore does not control the decision in this 
case.”). 
75. Id. at 356–57. 
76. Id. at 357. 
77. Id. at 355 n.11. 
78. Cohill, 484 U.S. at 355 n.11. 
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2. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence in Things Remembered, Inc. v.  Petrarca 
In Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,79 the petitioner filed a notice of 
removal pursuant to the bankruptcy removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a), and 
the general removal statute, § 1441(a).80 Although the bankruptcy court found 
that removal was proper under § 1441(a), on appeal the district court found that 
removal was untimely under both statutes and ultimately remanded the case to 
state court.81 The Sixth Circuit held that both § 1447(d) and § 1452(b) insulated 
the remand order from appellate review and dismissed the appeal.82 The 
question before the Court was whether § 1447(d) barred appellate review of “a 
district court order remanding a bankruptcy case to state court on grounds of 
untimely removal.”83 In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that because the 
district court “remanded this case on grounds of untimely removal, precisely the 
type of removal defect contemplated by § 1447(c),” § 1447(d) precluded 
appellate review of the court’s remand order.84 The Court also made it clear that 
“[§] 1447(d) applies ‘not only to remand orders made in suits removed under 
[the general removal statute], but to orders of remand made in cases removed 
under any other statutes, as well.’”85 Thus, under Things Remembered, § 1447(d) 
must be read in pari materia with all removal statutes. 
Justice Kennedy wrote separately, however, to express his understanding 
that the Court’s holding was “not intended to bear upon the reviewability of 
Cohill orders.”86 He apparently was concerned that appellate courts would 
understand Things Remembered to mean that remand orders based on statutory 
authority are immune from review under § 1447(d), but remand orders that lack 
statutory authorization—such as those permitted in Cohill—are not. Thus, 
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Cohill Court “did not find it necessary to 
decide” whether § 1447(d) would bar review of Cohill remand orders,87 but 
decided only that district courts could remand pendent claims rather than dismiss 
them. Although he recognized that appellate courts had “relied on Thermtron to 
hold that § 1447(d) bars appellate review of § 1447(c) remands but not remands 
 
79. 516 U.S. 124 (1995). 
80. Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 126. 
81. Id. at 126–27 & n.2. 
82. Id. at 127. 
83. Id. at 125. 
84. Id. at 128. 
85. Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 128 (quoting United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 752 
(1946)). The Court stated that “[a]bsent a clear statutory command to the contrary, [it] assume[s] that 
Congress is ‘aware of the universality of th[e] practice’ of denying appellate review of remand orders 
when Congress creates a new ground for removal.” Id. (quoting Rice, 327 U.S. at 752). Because 
Congress did not expressly indicate in § 1452 that it “intended [the] statute to be the exclusive 
provision governing removals and remands in bankruptcy” and there was no “reason to infer from § 
1447(d) that Congress intended to exclude bankruptcy cases from its coverage,” § 1447(d) applied and 
the remand order at issue was not subject to appellate review. Id. at 129. 
86. Id. at 129 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
87. Id. at 130. 
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ordered under Cohill,”88 he ended his concurrence by stating: “The issues raised 
by those decisions are not before us.”89 
3. Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co. 
Despite Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Things Remembered, later in the 
same term the Court held in Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co.90 that § 
1447(d) is inapplicable to abstention-based remands and therefore they are 
reviewable on appeal.91 Significantly, abstention-based remands, like Cohill 
remands, are not expressly provided for in § 1447(c) or any other statute. 
Instead, the power to abstain derives from “the historic discretion exercised by 
federal courts ‘sitting in equity’” to decline to exercise their jurisdiction.92 Citing 
 
88. Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 130.  
89. Id. 
90. 517 U.S. 706 (1996). In Quackenbush, the California insurance commissioner sued Allstate 
Insurance Company in state court “seeking contract and tort damages for Allstate’s alleged breach of 
certain reinsurance agreements, as well as a general declaration of Allstate’s obligations under those 
agreements.” 517 U.S. at 709. Invoking diversity jurisdiction, Allstate removed the case and filed a 
motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. The commissioner then moved 
for remand, arguing that the district court should abstain under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 
(1943) because its resolution of the case might interfere with California’s regulation of the insurance 
industry. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 709. Specifically, the commissioner indicated that there was “a 
hotly disputed question of state law” involved in the case, and that this question was already “pending 
before the state courts.” Id. The district court remanded the case primarily because it was concerned 
that the state and federal courts might rule differently on the disputed issue of state law and thereby 
produce inconsistent decisions. Id. at 709–10. The Ninth Circuit reversed, id. at 710, and the Supreme 
Court affirmed on different grounds, id. at 711. The Court recognized that it had long held in its 
abstention decisions that federal courts can dismiss cases where equitable relief is sought and 
exceptional circumstances are present. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716–17. The Court also 
acknowledged that over time it had expanded the power of the federal courts to decline to extend 
their jurisdiction to all cases in which discretionary relief is sought and exceptional circumstances are 
present. Id. at 718. The Court pointed out, however, that in prior abstention cases where damages 
were sought, it had only permitted a federal court “to enter a stay order that postpones adjudication of 
the dispute, not to dismiss the federal suit altogether.” Id. at 719 (citing La. Power & Light Co. v. City 
of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28–30 (1959)). The Court concluded that abstention-based remands or 
dismissals of damages actions are an improper use of the federal courts’ discretionary power to decline 
to exercise their jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances. Id. at 721. Because the case at bar was an 
action for damages, “the District Court’s remand order was an unwarranted application of the Burford 
[abstention] doctrine.” Id. at 731. 
91. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 711–12. The Quackenbush Court also held that remand orders that 
do not fall within § 1447(c) and (d) are appealable as final judgments under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. at 
712–15. Thus, Quackenbush disavowed the Thermtron Court’s statement that “‘an order remanding a 
removed action does not represent a final judgment reviewable by appeal’” and therefore can be 
reviewed only through a writ of mandamus. Id. at 714–15 (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. 
Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 352–53 (1976)). 
92. Id. at 718; see also id. at 717 (stating that “it has long been established that a federal court has 
the authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it is asked to employ its historic powers as a 
court of equity” and concluding that “[t]his tradition . . . explains the development of our abstention 
doctrines” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Federal courts abstain only in exceptional 
circumstances. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716. They do so “out of deference to the paramount interests 
of another sovereign, and the concern is with principles of comity and federalism.” Id. at 723. For a 
description of the relationship between courts’ jurisdictional duties to hear cases and abstention 
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both Thermtron and Things Remembered, the Quackenbush Court reiterated 
that § 1447(c) and § 1447(d) must be read together “‘so that only remands based 
on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).’”93 
Without additional explanation, the Court concluded that because abstention-
based remands are not remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect 
in removal procedure, § 1447(d) is inapplicable to them.94 
4. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc. 
In 2007, the Court decided Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Services, Inc.,95 
 
doctrines, see generally Deborah J. Challener, Distinguishing Certification from Abstention in 
Diversity Cases: Postponement Versus Abdication of the Duty to Exercise Jurisdiction, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 
847, 849–65 (2007). 
93. 517 U.S. at 711–12 (quoting Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 127). 
94. Id. at 712. At the time Quackenbush was decided, the 1988 version of § 1447(c) was in effect. 
Thus, the Quackenbush Court concluded that abstention-based remands are not based on lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in removal procedure. 
95. 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007). In addition to Powerex, the Court also recently decided Kircher v. 
Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633 (2006) and Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007). 
 In Kircher, the district court remanded several cases to state court on the ground that it lacked 
jurisdiction over them under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”). 547 
U.S. at 637–38. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the district court’s decision to remand 
was substantive, not jurisdictional, and therefore § 1447(d) did not prohibit it from reviewing the 
remand order. Id. at 638–39. 
 The Supreme Court vacated and remanded. Id. at 648. It noted that it has “relentlessly repeated 
that ‘any remand order issued on the grounds specified in § 1447(c) [is immunized from all forms of 
appellate review], whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous by an appellate court.” Id. at 
640 (alteration in original) (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc., 423 U.S. at 351). Citing Things 
Remembered, the Court further stated that “[t]he bar of § 1447(d) applies equally to cases removed 
under the general removal statute, § 1441, and to those removed under other provisions, . . . and the 
force of the bar is not subject to any statutory exception that might cover this case.” Id. at 641 (citation 
omitted). The district court “said that it was remanding for lack of jurisdiction, an unreviewable 
ground,” and “look[ing] beyond the court’s own label,” the remand orders were “unmistakably 
premised” on the district court’s view that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Kircher, 547 U.S. at 
641. Thus, the Court concluded that the remand orders were issued pursuant to § 1447(c) and 
therefore were immune from appellate review under § 1447(d). Id. 
 In Osborn, the Court addressed the interaction of § 1447(c) and (d) with the Westfall Act. The 
Westfall Act “accords federal employees absolute immunity from common-law tort claims arising out 
of . . . their official duties.” 549 U.S. at 229 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1)). “When a federal employee 
is sued for wrongful or negligent conduct, the [Westfall] Act empowers the Attorney General to 
certify that the employee ‘was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the 
incident out of which the claim arose.’” Id. at 229–30 (quoting § 2679(d)(1), (2)). Once the certification 
occurs, “the United States is substituted as defendant in place of the employee,” and “[t]he litigation is 
thereafter governed by the Federal Tort Claims Act.” Id. at 230. If the action is filed in state court, the 
Westfall Act provides that it is to be removed to federal court and renders the Attorney General’s 
certification “‘conclusiv[e] . . . for purposes of removal.’” Id. (quoting § 2679(d)(2)). 
 In Osborn, “the United States Attorney, serving as the Attorney General’s delegate, certified 
that [the defendant] was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the conduct alleged” 
in the plaintiff’s complaint and removed the case to a federal district court.” Id. at 230–31. The district 
court rejected the Westfall Act certification, “denied the Government’s motion to substitute the 
United States as [a] defendant,” and remanded the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Osborn, 
549 U.S. at 231. 
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another § 1447(d) case. In Powerex, four third-party defendants removed the 
case.96 Powerex and a corporation owned by British Columbia removed pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d), which permits a “foreign state,” as defined by the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), to remove.97 The other two third-party 
defendants were United States agencies;98 they removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1442(a), which authorizes removal by federal agencies.99 
The district court determined that sections 1441(d) and 1442(a) permit a 
defendant to remove the entire case and therefore concluded that the removal 
was proper.100 Ultimately, however, the district court remanded all of the claims 
 
 One question on appeal was whether the district court had authority under the Westfall Act to 
remand the case. See id. (examining scope of appellate review permitted under Westfall Act). The 
Supreme Court held that “once certification and removal are effected, exclusive competence to 
adjudicate the case resides in the federal court, and that court may not remand the suit to the state 
court.” Id. at 231. 
 A second question on appeal was whether § 1447(d) barred appellate review of the remand order 
in the case at bar even though it was improper. See id. at 231–32 (addressing whether appellate review 
of remand order was barred under § 1447(d)). The Court concluded that § 1447(d) was inapplicable 
and that the remand order was reviewable. See id. (holding § 1447(d) “does not displace § 
2679(d)(2)”). The Court reasoned that in this case, “§ 1447(c) and (d) must be read together with the 
later enacted § 2679(d)(2). Both § 1447(d) and § 2679(d)(2) are antishuttling provisions. Each aims to 
prevent ‘prolonged litigation of questions of jurisdiction of the district court to which the cause is 
removed.’” Osborn, 549 U.S. at 243 (quoting United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 751 (1946)). 
According to the Court, only one “of the two antishuttling commands” could prevail, and it held that 
“§ 2679(d)(2) controls.” Id. at 244. The Court insisted that its decision “scarcely mean[t] that whenever 
the district court misconstrues a jurisdictional statute, appellate review of the remand is in order.” Id. 
The Court acknowledged that “[s]uch an exception would . . . collide head on with § 1447(d), and with 
[its] precedent.” Id. (citing Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. at 127–28). Thus, the Court emphasized 
that “[o]nly in the extraordinary case in which Congress has ordered the intercourt shuttle to travel 
just one way—from state to federal court—does [its] decision hold sway.” Id. 
96. 127 S. Ct. at 2414. The Powerex Court actually referred to the third-party defendants as 
“cross-defendants.” Id. In the parlance of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, however, they were 
third-party defendants because the original defendants joined them to the action in order to seek 
indemnification. See id. (noting that Powerex was joined by defendant “seeking indemnity”); FED. R. 
CIV. P. 14(a)(1) (“A defending party may, as third-party plaintiff, serve a summons and complaint on a 
nonparty who is or may be liable to it for all or part of the claim against it.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 14(a)(2) 
(referring to “[t]he person served with the summons and third-party complaint” as “the ‘third-party 
defendant’”). The Powerex Court presumably referred to the third-party defendants as cross-
defendants because the case was originally filed in a California state court, Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. 
at 2414, the third-party defendants were joined to the action in state court, id., and the California 
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an original defendant can join a party to the action by filing a 
“cross-complaint” against the nonparty, see CAL. CIV. P. CODE § 428.10(b) (West 2008) (“A party 
against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint . . . may file a cross-complaint setting 
forth . . . [a]ny cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such 
person is already a party to the action . . . .”); Jack H. Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, 
and Cross-Complaints: Suggested Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30–35 
(1970) (discussing California state rules regarding mandatory and permissive cross-complaints against 
third parties). 
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because it found that (1) Powerex did not qualify as a “foreign state” under the 
FSIA; (2) the British Columbian corporation was immune from suit in federal 
court under the FSIA; and (3) the federal agencies were immune from suit in 
state court, and therefore a federal court could not acquire jurisdiction over 
them upon removal.101 After concluding that § 1447(d) did not prohibit appellate 
review of the remand order, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court but 
concluded that it should have dismissed the claims against the federal agencies 
instead of remanding them.102 
Only Powerex appealed to the Supreme Court,103 and the Court held that it 
did not have appellate jurisdiction to review the remand order.104 The Court first 
rejected the argument that § 1447(d) bars appellate review of remand orders 
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction only if jurisdiction was absent at 
the time of removal.105 Relying on the language of § 1447(c) and its history, the 
Court concluded that when a case is properly removed but the district court 
subsequently determines that it lacks jurisdiction, “the remand is covered by § 
1447(c) and thus shielded from review by § 1447(d).”106 The Court reasoned that 
“[n]othing in the text of § 1447(c) supports the proposition that a remand for 
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not covered so long as the case was properly 
removed in the first instance.”107 Indeed, while the language of the 1948 version 
of the statute provided for remand if the case “‘was removed improvidently and 
without jurisdiction,’”108 the 1988 version and the current version require remand 
“[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction.”109 
Furthermore, the Court pointed out, the “same section of the public law 
that amended § 1447(c) to include the phrase ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ also 
created” the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).110 Section 1447(e) provides: 
“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder 
would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit 
joinder and remand the action to State court.”111 According to the Court, § 
1447(e) “unambiguously demonstrates that a case can be properly removed and 
yet suffer from a failing in subject matter jurisdiction that requires remand.”112 
Because the phrase “subject matter jurisdiction” was inserted into § 1447(c) and 
 
101. Id. at 2414–15. 
102. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2415. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 2417. 
105. Id. at 2416. 
106. Id. at 2417. 
107. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2416. 
108. Id. at 2415 (emphasis added) (quoting Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 
336, 342 (1976)). 
109. Id. at 2415–16 (emphasis added) (quoting Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act 
of 1988, Title X, § 1016(c)(1), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006))). 
110. Id. at 2417 (citing § 1016(c), 102 Stat. at 4670). 
 111. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (emphasis added). 
112. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417. 
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(e) at the same time, under principles of statutory construction it should be 
construed to have the same meaning in both subsections of the statute.113 Thus, if 
removal is jurisdictionally proper but the district court later remands because 
subject matter jurisdiction has been destroyed, appellate review of the remand 
order is prohibited under § 1447(d). 
The Powerex Court next addressed the question of whether the district 
court had remanded the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.114 The Court 
first examined the remand order itself to determine how the district court had 
characterized the remand.115 The Court concluded that the district court 
purported to remand on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because (1) the heading of the remand order’s “discussion section” was “entitled 
‘Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Removed Actions’”; (2) “the District 
Court explicitly stated that the remand ‘issue hinge[d] . . . on the Court’s 
jurisdictional authority to hear the removed claims’”; and (3) in its order denying 
a stay of the remand, the district court “repeatedly stated that a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction required remand pursuant to § 1447(c).”116 
The Powerex Court then assumed without deciding “that § 1447(d) permits 
appellate courts to look behind the district court’s characterization” of a remand 
order as jurisdictional.117 The Court held, however, that “review of the District 
Court’s characterization of its remand as resting upon lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, to the extent it is permissible at all, should be limited to confirming 
that that characterization was colorable.”118 After “looking behind” the district 
court’s remand order, the Court concluded that the only “plausible” explanation 
for the remand was that the district court believed it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims against Powerex once it decided that 
Powerex was not a “foreign state” capable of independently removing the case 
and that the other defendants were immune from suit.119 
The Court acknowledged that it had never decided whether subject matter 






117. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417. Writing for the majority in Powerex, Justice Scalia noted 
that the question of whether § 1447(d) permits appellate courts to look behind the district court’s 
characterization was reserved in Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust and that “[t]he Court’s opinion in 
Osborn v. Haley . . . had nothing to say about the scope of review that is permissible under § 1447(d).” 
Id. at 2417–18 & n.2. At least for Justices Scalia and Thomas, the district court’s characterization of the 
remand order in Powerex as jurisdictional was enough to bring it within § 1447(d). Id. (citing Osborn v. 
Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 264 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., dissenting)). However, “because 
(presumably) [Justice Scalia] could not convince a majority of the Justices to join him on this point” in 
Powerex, “he looked behind the district court’s characterization” of the remand order. Posting of Scott 
Dodson to Civil Procedure Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2007/06/ 
powerex_corp_v_.html (June 18, 2007). 
118. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2418. 
119. Id. at 2417–18. 
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claims against the only parties capable of removing.120 Because the point was 
“debatable,” however, the district court’s characterization of the remand as 
subject matter jurisdictional was colorable and the Court concluded that the 
remand was immune from appellate review under § 1447(d).121 The Court 
reasoned that “[l]engthy appellate disputes about whether an arguable 
jurisdictional ground invoked by the district court was properly such would 
frustrate the purpose of § 1447(d).”122 
The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the remand order 
was based on the district court’s discretionary decision not to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction and therefore was reviewable on appeal.123 The Court 
again looked at the remand order and again concluded that the district court 
“relied upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” as the basis for remand.124 
According to the Powerex Court, the district court “never mentioned the 
possibility of supplemental jurisdiction . . . in its original decision . . . []or in its 
order denying [Powerex’s] motion to stay the remand pending appeal.”125 In 
addition, it did not appear that the defendant had ever made any argument to 
the district court “that supplemental jurisdiction was a basis for retaining the 
claims against it.”126 Thus, there was “no reason to believe that an unmentioned 
nonexercise of Cohill discretion was the basis for the remand.”127 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court assumed that supplemental 
jurisdiction was available in the circumstances of the case and that Cohill 
remands are reviewable on appeal.128 Of crucial importance here, however, the 
Court stated: “It is far from clear . . . that when discretionary supplemental 
jurisdiction is declined the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d).”129 Echoing Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence in Things Remembered, the Court further emphasized 
that it has “never passed on whether Cohill remands are subject-matter 
jurisdictional for purposes of post-1988 versions of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d).”130 
 
120. Id. at 2418. 
121. Id. In the Powerex case itself, it appears that removal was “proper” (or at least the Court 
assumed it was) in that it satisfied the statutory requirements of §§ 1441(d) and 1442(a). Jurisdiction, 
however, was lacking (based on the district court’s analysis) even at the time of removal. There was no 
postremoval event that destroyed subject matter jurisdiction because it never existed in the first place. 
Thus, it is not clear that the Powerex Court needed to reach the question of whether, when removal is 
jurisdictionally proper, a postremoval event that gives rise to a defect in jurisdiction can result in a 
remand that is immune from appellate review. 
122. Id. 
123. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2418–19. 
124. Id. at 2419. 
125. Id. (citation omitted). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. See Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2418–19 (assuming decline of supplemental jurisdiction 
precludes remand for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 2419 n.4 (citing Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129–30 (1995) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 355 n.11 (1988)). Before 
  
2008] REMAND AND APPELLATE REVIEW 1089 
 
D. Appellate Courts and Remand of Supplemental Claims 
1. Pre-Powerex Decisions 
Prior to Powerex, the courts of appeals relied on Thermtron and Cohill to 
uniformly conclude that Cohill remands are not made pursuant to § 1447(c) and 
therefore § 1447(d) is inapplicable to them.131 More specifically, these courts 
 
concluding its opinion, the Court rejected two additional arguments made by the defendant as to why 
the remand order was reviewable. First, the defendant contended that “§ 1447(d) does not preclude 
review of a district court’s merits determinations that precede . . . remand.” Id. at 2419. The Court 
recognized that it held in Waco v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 U.S. 140 (1934) that 
orders which precede remand are reviewable on appeal. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2419. In the case 
at bar, however, there was no district court order “separate from the remand” and therefore Waco did 
not permit appellate review. Id. Second, the defendant argued that § 1447(d) was inapplicable because 
the case was removed under the FSIA and “Congress could not have intended to grant district judges 
irrevocable authority to decide questions with such sensitive foreign-relations implications.” Id. at 
2419–20. The Court rejected this argument because Congress has not authorized appellate review of 
FSIA remands, and the Court would not “ignore [§ 1447(d)] in reliance upon supposition of what 
Congress really wanted.” Id. at 2420. Moreover, the defendant’s “divination of congressional intent 
[was] flatly refuted by longstanding precedent.” Id. at 2420 (citing Things Remembered, Inc., 516 U.S. 
at 128; United States v. Rice, 327 U.S. 742, 752 (1946)). 
131. For examples of various circuit courts applying the principle that § 1447(d) only bars 
appellate review where the remand was based on § 1447(c), see Regan v. Starcraft Marine, LLC, 524 
F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2008); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Warrantech Corp., 461 F.3d 568, 571–
72 (5th Cir. 2006); Connolly v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., Inc., 427 F.3d 127, 128 (1st Cir. 2005); Ali v. 
Ramsdell, 423 F.3d 810, 812–13 (8th Cir. 2005); DaWalt v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 397 F.3d 392, 396–402 
(6th Cir. 2005); Baker v. Kingsley, 387 F.3d 649, 653–57 (7th Cir. 2004); Bryan v. Bellsouth Commc’ns, 
Inc., 377 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2004); Adkins v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 326 F.3d 828, 830–34 (7th Cir. 
2003); Lindsey v. Dillard’s, Inc., 306 F.3d 596, 598–99 (8th Cir. 2002); First Nat’l Bank of Pulaski v. 
Curry, 301 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2002); Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 594–95 (8th Cir. 
2002); Hinson v. Norwest Fin. S.C., Inc., 239 F.3d 611, 614–15 (4th Cir. 2001); Long v. Bando Mfg., 
Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 758 (6th Cir. 2000); Giles v. NYLCare Health Plans, Inc., 172 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 
1999); Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1350–51 (11th Cir. 1998); Hudson 
United Bank v. LiTenda Mortgage Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 155, 157–58 (3d Cir. 1998); St. John v. Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 139 F.3d 1214, 1216–17 (8th Cir. 1998); First Union Nat’l 
Bank of Fla. v. Hall, 123 F.3d 1374, 1377–78 (11th Cir. 1997); Pa. Nurses Ass’n v. Pa. State Educ. 
Ass’n, 90 F.3d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1996); Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 541–42 
(8th Cir. 1996); Mangold v. Analytic Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1442, 1450–53 (4th Cir. 1996); Trans Penn 
Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 221–25 (3d Cir. 1995); Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 615–
16 (5th Cir. 1994); Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 1994); Bogle v. Phillips 
Petroleum Co., 24 F.3d 758, 761–62 (5th Cir. 1994); Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. 
Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled by Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Prairie Island Dakota Sioux, 21 F.3d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1994); Burks v. 
Amerada Hess Corp., 8 F.3d 301, 303–04 (5th Cir. 1993); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. Thompson, 987 
F.2d 682, 684 (10th Cir. 1993); In re Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Int’l Union, 
983 F.2d 725, 727 (6th Cir. 1993); Albertson’s, Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478, 1479–80 (10th Cir. 1993); 
Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1539 (9th Cir. 1992); In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 
974 F.2d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964 F.2d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 
1992); J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 269–70 (7th Cir. 1990); Hansen v. Blue 
Cross of Cal., 891 F.2d 1384, 1390 (9th Cir. 1989); Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 
1101, 1106 n.4 (4th Cir. 1989); In re Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 857 F.2d 1190, 1193 n.1 (8th Cir. 1988); 
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concluded that where a federal claim is eliminated from a removed case and a 
district court remands any remaining state law claims, the remand order is 
reviewable.132 
Many of these courts reasoned that § 1447(c) authorizes the remand of only 
those cases in which removal is improper (1) due to a defect in removal 
procedure or (2) because jurisdiction is lacking at the time of removal. 
According to these courts, Cohill remands are not based on § 1447(c) because in 
those cases there is no question that jurisdiction exists at the time of removal: the 
federal claim provides an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction in 
federal court and either pendent jurisdiction or § 1367(a)—depending on when 
the case was decided—provides supplemental jurisdiction over the state law 
claims. Thus, unless there is a defect in removal procedure,133 the removal is 
 
Price v. PSA, Inc., 829 F.2d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 1987); Scott v. Machinists Auto. Trades Dist. Lodge No. 
190, 827 F.2d 589, 592 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Romulus Cmty. Schs., 729 F.2d 431, 434–35 (6th Cir. 1984). 
132. When appellate courts reviewed Cohill remands prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), they did so by mandamus rather than 
appeal. See supra note 68 for an example of the Supreme Court finding that a writ of mandamus, not 
appeal, was the appropriate remedy. After the Quackenbush Court held that non-§ 1447(c) remands 
are appealable as final judgments, appellate courts reviewed Cohill remands by appeal. See supra 
notes 90–92 for an additional discussion of the Quackenbush holding. 
133. There does not appear to be any question that Cohill remands are not based on a defect in 
removal procedure. Under the 1948 version of § 1447(c), courts generally interpreted the phrase 
“improvident removal” to mean that district courts could remand for “errors in the removal process.” 
Snapper, Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Steinman, supra note 45, at 
961–62 (citing various cases and noting that Cohill Court did not “utilize the language of 
improvidence” but instead “found . . . that the case had been properly removed, and had remained 
properly removed”). Thus, in addition to holding that Cohill remands were not based on lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, lower courts consistently held that such remands were not based on 
improvident removal and therefore § 1447(d) was inapplicable to them. See Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1255 
& n.10 (citing multiple cases); Steinman, supra note 45, at 962 (stating that there was “no justification 
for concluding that [the 1948 version of] section 1447(c) authorize[d] the remand of pendent claims on 
the theory that they were removed ‘without jurisdiction’”). 
 When § 1447(c) was amended in 1988, the legislative history specifically stated that the 
amendment was “written in terms of a defect in ‘removal procedure’ in order to avoid any implication 
that remand is unavailable after disposition of all federal questions leaves only State law questions that 
might be decided as a matter of . . . pendent jurisdiction or that instead might be remanded.” H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-889, at 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 6033; see also Snapper, 171 F.3d 
at 1256 n.13 (stating that change in language from “removed improvidently” to “any defect in removal 
procedure” is “best understood as a congressional ratification of . . . consistent judicial practice in 
order to preclude any misapplication of the new [thirty-day] time limit” on filing remand motions 
based on defect in removal procedure); Siegel, supra note 43 (stating that “dropping out” of claim on 
which original jurisdiction is based is not defect in removal procedure “that would trigger the 30-day 
rule”). In keeping with the legislative history, after the 1988 amendment lower courts continued to 
conclude that Cohill remands were not based on a defect in removal procedure and therefore § 
1447(d) was inapplicable to them on that ground. Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1256–57 & n.17; see also id. at 
1257 (stating that with regard to Cohill remands, this result made sense because it is unlikely that 
Cohill remand order would be “ripe” within thirty days of removal). 
 When § 1447(c) was again amended in 1996, a question arose as to how expansively the phrase 
“any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction” should be interpreted. Specifically, lower 
courts began to address whether “any defect” referred only to defects in removal procedure or if, 
instead, it meant that motions to remand on any ground other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
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proper and any remand of state law claims is not pursuant to § 1447(c). Instead, 
the district court’s power to remand derives from either the doctrine of pendent 
or supplemental jurisdiction and the Supreme Court’s decision in Cohill. 
Accordingly, these courts concluded that § 1447(d) is inapplicable to Cohill 
remands.134 
 
were now covered by § 1447(c)’s thirty-day time limit and therefore immune from appellate review 
under § 1447(d). E.g., Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica de Puerto Rico v. Ericsson Inc., 201 F.3d 15, 16–
17 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that § 1447(d) does not bar review of remand based on forum selection 
clause); Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1252–60 (same); Hudson United Bank, 142 F.3d at 157 (finding that § 
1447(d) does not bar review of remand order because it was issued under § 1367(c), not § 1447(c)); see 
also David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1996 Revision of Section 1447(c), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447 (2006) 
(stating that the “other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction” language is “like a residuary clause” 
and could include Cohill remands within its reach). 
 Ultimately, the lower courts have concluded that the 1996 amendment applies to defects in 
removal procedure only, and therefore it did not make remands on any ground—including Cohill 
remands—subject to the thirty-day limit or expand the types of remands covered by § 1447(c) and (d). 
See, e.g., Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica de Puerto Rico, 201 F.3d at 16–17 (concluding that § 1447(d) 
does not bar review of remand order based on forum selection clause because order was not issued 
pursuant to § 1447(c)); Snapper, 171 F.3d at 1252–60 (same); Hudson United Bank, 142 F.3d at 157–58 
(concluding that § 1447(d) did not bar review of order remanding supplemental state claims after 
federal claims had been dismissed because order was not issued pursuant to § 1447(c)); see also 
Hudson United Bank, 142 F.3d at 156 n.8 (stating that rather than understanding the 1996 amendment 
“as a wholesale rejection of Thermtron and a dramatic expansion of § 1447(d),” court would “assume 
that Congress did not mean to upset the Thermtron limits on § 1447(d), and that they remain in effect 
unchanged by the intervening textual modifications to § 1447(c)”). Moreover, the Powerex Court 
stated that it would assume that the 1996 amendment “was immaterial to Thermtron’s gloss on § 
1447(d), so that the prohibition on appellate review remains limited to remands based on [lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction and defects in removal procedure].” Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2416. 
134. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank, 301 F.3d at 460 (finding that district court’s remand order was 
reviewable because district court could not have concluded that it had supplemental jurisdiction over 
state law claims and declined to exercise that jurisdiction “had it determined that it never had subject-
matter jurisdiction over the removed case”); Hudson United Bank, 142 F.3d at 157–58 (distinguishing § 
1447(c) and Cohill remands on ground that “§1447(c) remands are warranted only when a federal 
court has no rightful authority to adjudicate a state case that has been removed from state court,” 
whereas Cohill remands “may be entered only when federal subject matter jurisdiction has been 
affirmatively established, via [§1367(a)] and . . . . [therefore] does not imply that the case was 
improperly filed in federal court”); Trans Penn Wax Corp., 50 F.3d at 223 (“[A] remand only falls 
under § 1447(c) if the removal itself was jurisdictionally improper, not if the defect arose after 
removal.”); Bogle, 24 F.3d at 761–62 (stating that “critical distinction” between nonreviewable § 
1447(c) remand and reviewable [Cohill] remand is that “[i]n a Section 1447(c) remand, federal 
jurisdiction never existed, and in a non-Section 1447(c) remand, federal jurisdiction did exist at some 
point in the litigation, but the federal claims were either settled or dismissed”); Executive Software N. 
Am., Inc., 24 F.3d at 1549 (stating that discretionary remand of supplemental claims is not done 
pursuant to §1447(c) because in supplemental claim cases district court has asserted original 
jurisdiction over at least one claim); Sever, 978 F.2d at 1539 (finding that remand of state claims was 
reviewable because original removal was proper); cf. DaWalt, 397 F.3d at 400–02 (recognizing that § 
1447(c) “on its face prohibits appellate review of subject-matter-jurisdiction remands that the district 
judge makes ‘at any time,’” including those based on postremoval events, but concluding that 
discretionary remands of pendent state law claims are exception to § 1447(c) and (d)); Adkins, 326 
F.3d at 832–34 (stating that “any remand based on a conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking at the 
time of removal is covered by § 1447(c) [and (d)], no matter when that fact becomes apparent,” but 
further stating that if remand is based on “discretionary exercise of the power to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction,” then remand is reviewable on appeal). 
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Moreover, some courts further reason that the district court does not lose 
jurisdiction over the state law claims postremoval. They note that it is undisputed 
that a federal court has the power to adjudicate the supplemental claims even 
after the federal claim has been eliminated or, alternatively, the district court can 
remand the state law claims. Because the decision whether to hear or remand the 
state law claims is discretionary, these courts conclude that the remand is not for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1447(c) and § 1447(d) therefore is 
inapplicable.135 
2. Post-Powerex: HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial 
Co. 
In HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co.,136 the Federal 
Circuit became the first appellate court to hold that Cohill remands fall within § 
1447(c) and thus are immune from appellate review under § 1447(d).137 
 
135. See, e.g., Lindsey, 306 F.3d at 599 (stating that Cohill remand is not remand for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction because district court “is not required to remand state law claims when the 
only federal claim has been dismissed,” but instead “maintains discretion to either remand the state 
law claims or keep them in federal court”); Long, 201 F.3d at 758 (“Here, the district court did not 
remand because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction; on the contrary, the district court explicitly stated 
that it had subject matter jurisdiction when the case was removed and noted that it had not been 
divested of that jurisdiction by the dismissal of the plaintiff’s federal claims.”); First Union Nat’l Bank, 
123 F.3d at 1377–78 (finding that remand order was reviewable because district court never stated that 
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, “believed it had supplemental jurisdiction to hear the [state law 
claim] under section 1367,” and based its remand order on its decision not to exercise its discretion to 
hear supplemental claim); Gaming Corp., 88 F.3d at 542 (“Because the district court never lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction and remanded under § 1367, neither § 1447(d) nor any other statutory bar 
exists to [appellate review of the remand order].”); In re Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied 
Workers Int’l Union, 983 F.2d at 727 (finding that order remanding state law claims after federal claims 
had been dismissed was reviewable because remand was “discretionary” and “did not stem from lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining claims”); In re Surinam Airways Holding Co., 974 
F.2d at 1257 (concluding that Cohill remand is reviewable on appeal because it is not “premised on 
either a defect in removal procedure or a lack of jurisdiction” under § 1447(c), but instead “is a 
discretionary decision declining the exercise of expressly acknowledged jurisdiction”); Baker, Watts & 
Co., 876 F.2d at 1106 n.4 (stating that because “[t]he district court did not believe that plaintiff’s 
common law claims were improvidently removed and clearly recognized that it had the jurisdictional 
power to resolve them on the merits even after dismissal of the federal claims,” discretionary decision 
to remand them was “not jurisdictional” and therefore was reviewable on appeal); Price, 829 F.2d at 
874 (finding that remand order was reviewable because removal was proper and district court’s 
decision to remand remaining state claims was discretionary rather than mandatory); Scott, 827 F.2d at 
592 (finding that remand order was reviewable because state law claims were within district court’s 
supplemental jurisdiction, district court retained power to hear them after federal claims were 
dismissed, and district court remanded them in its discretion, not because removal itself was 
improper). 
136. 508 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437). 
137. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667. At least three circuits have already declined to follow HIF 
Bio. Brookshire Bros. Holding, Inc. v. Dayco Prods., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 600–01 (5th Cir. 2009); Cal. 
Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Bates v. Mo. & 
N. Ark. R.R. Co., 548 F.3d 634, 636 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008) (noting that district court's remand order was 
reviewable on appeal because it was based on “refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” rather 
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a. The District Court’s Remand Order 
The plaintiffs in HIF Bio brought suit in a California state court, and the 
defendants removed the case.138 After the defendants removed, the plaintiffs 
filed their first amended complaint (“FAC”) and asserted multiple claims.139 
According to the district court, the plaintiffs first asserted two claims for 
declaratory relief “with respect to ownership and inventorship” of an anticancer 
agent.140 Second, the plaintiffs alleged violation of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000).141 Third, 
the plaintiffs asserted several state law claims: “slander, conversion, actual and 
constructive fraud, intentional and negligent interference with contractual 
relations and prospective economic advantage, breach of implied contract, unfair 
competition and fraudulent business practices, unjust enrichment and 
constructive trust.”142 Finally, the plaintiffs sought “a permanent injunction 
restraining the Defendants from representing themselves as the inventors” of the 
anticancer agent.143 
One of the defendants, Carlsbad Technology, Inc. (“CTI”), then filed a 
motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure 
to state a claim.144 The district court issued an order granting the motion to 
dismiss and remanding the case. Part B of the order’s “Discussion Section” was 
labeled “Analysis,” and subsection 1 of Part B was entitled “State Claims.”145 In 
that subsection, the district court stated in toto: 
 As a preliminary matter, the Court declines to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims in the FAC. The FAC 
contains twelve causes of action, eleven of which are state claims. The 
state claims clearly predominate over the federal RICO claim. The 
preponderance of state law issues means that a state court is the proper 
venue to try the state law claims.146 
Subsection 2 of the district court’s “Analysis” was labeled “Declaratory 
Judgment Claims.”147 In that subsection, the district court examined “the 
Plaintiffs’ first two claims for declaratory judgment to determine whether they 
[were] within the Court’s jurisdiction.”148 The district court rejected CTI’s 
argument “that these two causes of action should be considered federal because 
 
than “determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction,” but citing HIF Bio as contrary 
authority). 
138. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 661. 
139. Id. at 661–62. 
140. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., No. CV 05-07976 DDP, 2006 WL 6086295, at 
*1, *2, *4 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2006).  




145. HIF Bio, Inc., 2006 WL 6086295, at *3. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at *4. 
  
1094 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
 
they arise from the Patent Act, an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction.”149 
Instead, the court concluded that the declaratory judgment claims were “valid 
state law claims” and that it “[did] not have jurisdiction over” them.150 The 
district court then stated that it was remanding the declaratory judgment claims 
“along with the other state law claims.”151 
In subsection 3 of the remand order’s analysis section, the district court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to state a RICO claim.152 In its 
conclusion, the district court dismissed the RICO claim and again stated that it 
was remanding the state claims.153 
b. The Federal Circuit’s Opinion 
CTI appealed, and the Federal Circuit concluded that § 1447(d) prohibited 
it from exercising appellate jurisdiction to review the remand order.154 In 
describing the district court’s order, the Federal Circuit stated that the lower 
court “remanded all of the non-RICO causes of action . . . based on declining 
supplemental jurisdiction.”155 The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the district 
court held that it did not have an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction 
over the plaintiffs’ declaratory judgment claims.156 The appellate court reasoned, 
however, that “the district court did have federal question jurisdiction over the 
plaintiffs’ alleged RICO claim.”157 Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that the 
“RICO claim was the basis for the district court’s § 1367(a) supplemental 
jurisdiction over the inventorship and ownership claims, as well as the remaining 
nine state claims,” and § 1367(c) was the basis on which the district court 
remanded all of the state claims.158 
The Federal Circuit then proceeded to analyze whether Cohill remands are 
subject matter jurisdictional and therefore immune from appellate review. The 
court first recognized that many other appellate courts have held that these types 
of remands are reviewable on appeal.159 Nevertheless, the court interpreted 
Powerex “to reopen the question of whether § 1367(c) remands are barred from 
review under §§ 1447(c) and (d).”160 Relying on Powerex, the court held that 
because a Cohill remand “can be colorably characterized as a remand based on 
 
149. Id. 
150. HIF Bio, Inc., 2006 WL 6086295, at *4. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at *4–*5. 
153. Id. at *6. 
154. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659, 663 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437). 
155. Id. at 664. 




159. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 665. 
160. Id. at 666. 
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction” under § 1447(c), it is “barred from appellate 
review by § 1447(d).”161 
The court reasoned that supplemental state law claims by definition lack an 
independent basis of jurisdiction and therefore a court has power over them only 
if they fall within § 1367(a).162 According to the Federal Circuit, however, “[t]he 
text of § 1367(a) indicates [that] § 1367(c) constitutes an express statutory 
exception to the authorization of jurisdiction granted by § 1367(a).”163 Thus, 
“when declining supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, a district court strips 
the claims of the only basis on which they are within the jurisdiction of the 
court.”164 Absent the “cloak of supplemental jurisdiction, [the] state claims must 
be remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”165 
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the argument that Cohill 
remands are similar to abstention-based remands and therefore, like abstention-
based remands, are subject to appellate review.166 The Federal Circuit 
recognized that courts abstain and decline supplemental jurisdiction for similar 
reasons and that both abstention and supplemental jurisdiction “are 
discretionary doctrines that allow a district court to decline jurisdiction.”167 
The court believed, however, that there is a “fundamental difference” 
between abstention-based remands and Cohill remands, which “compels a 
different result when applying the jurisdictional bar of § 1447(d).”168 It explained 
that when a court abstains, it declines to hear “claims over which it has an 
independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, whether it be federal question     
. . . or diversity jurisdiction.”169 Thus, “a remand premised on abstention cannot 
be colorably characterized as a remand based on lack of jurisdiction.”170 
According to the Federal Circuit, Cohill remands are distinguishable because the 
only basis for jurisdiction over supplemental claims is § 1367(a).171 And because 
the court believed that § 1367(c) is an exception to § 1367(a), it reasoned that 
once a court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction the state law claims 
no longer fall within § 1367(a) and therefore are without any jurisdictional 
basis.172 At that point, the Federal Circuit concluded, the district court must 
remand the state claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and § 1447(c) and 
(d) bar appellate review of the remand order.173 
 
161. Id. at 667. 
162. See id. (noting that unless courts grant supplemental jurisdiction, state claims must be 
remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). 
163. Id. (quoting Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
164. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 666–67. 
167. Id. at 666. 
168. Id. at 666–67. 
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III. COHILL REMANDS AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
This Part contends that the Supreme Court should reverse the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in HIF Bio v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co.174 that 
Cohill remands are based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 
1447(c)—or at least can be colorably characterized as such—and therefore are 
immune from appellate review under § 1447(d). Part III.A examines the 
Powerex Court’s conclusion that postremoval events can result in remands for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and how this conclusion relates to Cohill 
remands and HIF Bio. 
Part III.B argues that the Federal Circuit’s analysis in HIF Bio is flawed for 
two reasons. First, the court incorrectly concluded that Cohill remands are 
subject matter jurisdictional because it confused the existence of judicial power 
with the discretionary decision whether to exercise that power. Second, the court 
failed to apply the Powerex test properly to determine whether the district 
court’s characterization of the remand order in HIF Bio was jurisdictional and, if 
so, whether that characterization was colorable. Part III.B concludes that the 
Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit’s holding that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order because the district court 
did not characterize its remand as subject matter jurisdictional. Part III.B further 
concludes that the Supreme Court should hold that Cohill remands are not 
subject matter jurisdictional and any characterization of them as such is not 
colorable. 
Part III.C asserts that even if the Supreme Court ultimately determines that 
Cohill remands are subject matter jurisdictional, they do not fall within § 1447(c) 
because § 1447(c) is applicable only where a court determines that it lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction over a “case” and remands the entire case. Finally, 
Part III.D argues that in reaching a decision in HIF Bio, the Supreme Court 
should take into account the consequences of any conclusion that Cohill remands 
are covered by § 1447(c) and (d)—consequences that the Federal Circuit failed 
to consider. 
A. Postremoval Events 
The 1948 version of § 1447(c), which until 1949 was codified at subsection 
(e), provided for remand where a case was “removed improvidently and without 
jurisdiction.”175 In Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill,176 a case decided under 
the 1948 statute, the Court held that where a pendent claim case is properly 
removed and the federal claim is eliminated postremoval, a district court can 
 
174. 508 F.3d 659 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 
129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437). 
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (Supp. III 1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006)). See 
supra note 49 for a description of the 1948 and 1949 revisions of the Judicial Code. 
176. 484 U.S. 343 (1988). 
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remand the pendent claims instead of dismissing them.177 The Court said that the 
authority to remand did not derive from § 1447(c)—i.e., the case had not been 
removed improvidently and without jurisdiction—or any other part of “the 
removal statute.”178 
Instead, the power to remand “derive[d] from the doctrine of pendent 
jurisdiction”179 and the courts’ inherent authority “to deal with cases involving 
pendent claims in the manner that best serves the principles of economy, 
convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the pendent jurisdiction 
doctrine.”180 The Cohill Court thus concluded that the “remand authority 
conferred by the removal statute and the remand authority conferred by the 
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction overlap not at all.”181 Relying on Cohill, 
appellate courts reasoned that pendent claim remands were not subject to the 
review bar of § 1447(d) as long as removal was jurisdictionally proper.182 Even if 
a postremoval event deprived the court of jurisdiction, that event did not bring 
the case within § 1447(c) and (d). 
The current version of § 1447(c) states (and the 1988 version stated) in 
pertinent part: “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district 
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”183 Although 
the “general rule” is “that postremoval events do not deprive federal courts of 
subject-matter jurisdiction,”184 the Powerex Court nevertheless concluded that 
when removal is jurisdictionally proper but a postremoval event gives rise to a 
jurisdictional defect, “remand is authorized by § 1447(c) and appellate review is 
barred by § 1447(d).”185 As the Powerex Court explained, both the language of § 
1447(c) and its history support this reasoning.186 Furthermore, § 1447(e)—which 
 
177. See Cohill, 484 U.S. at 354–55 (reasoning that although removal statute does not address it, 
other evidence suggests Congress would have authorized remand). 
178. See id. at 355 n.11 (explaining authorization for remand under pendent jurisdiction is 
entirely independent of that under sections 1441(c) and 1447(c)). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 357. As the Cohill majority noted, id. at 355 n.11, even the three dissenting justices 
recognized that the authority for the remand of the pendent claims did not come from § 1447(c): “The 
Court today discovers an inherent power in the federal judiciary to remand properly removed cases to 
state court . . . . Because I continue to believe that cases may be remanded only for reasons authorized 
by statute . . . I dissent.” Cohill, 484 U.S. at 358 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also id. at 
364 (“[B]ecause I believe that any authority to remand properly removed pendent claims must come 
from Congress, I respectfully dissent.”). 
181. Id. at 355 n.11. 
182. See supra Part II.D.1 for a discussion of interpretations of Cohill. 
183. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006) (emphasis added). The 1988 version of the statute also contained 
this language. For a comparison of the language in the 1948, 1988, and 1996 versions of § 1447(c), see 
supra Part II.B.1. 
184. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 n.1 (2007) (citing Wis. 
Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391 (1998)); accord St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab 
Co., 303 U.S. 283, 292–93 (1938) (noting that events occurring after removal do not invalidate district 
court’s jurisdiction once it attaches); see also Steinman, supra note 43, at 886 (noting Court often has 
supported preservation of federal jurisdiction once it has been acquired). 
185. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417 n.1. 
186. See supra Part II.C.4 for additional discussion of the Powerex opinion. 
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provides for remand of the case if the district court permits joinder of a 
nondiverse defendant after removal—“unambiguously demonstrates that a case 
can be properly removed and yet suffer from a failing in subject matter 
jurisdiction that requires remand.”187 
Thus, under Powerex, appellate courts can no longer simply determine that 
a case was properly removed and conclude on that basis that the remand of 
supplemental claims is not a remand pursuant to § 1447(c). The HIF Bio court 
acknowledged this in a footnote when it said: “[F]rom a temporal perspective at 
least, § 1367(c) remands are now potentially within the class of remands 
described in § 1447(c) and thus subject to the jurisdictional bar of § 1447(d).”188 
The question remains, however, whether the remand of claims over which the 
district court has declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is required due to 
a jurisdictional defect. As the Court pointed out in Powerex, it has “never passed 
on whether Cohill remands are subject-matter jurisdictional for purposes of post-
1988 versions of § 1447(c).”189 Part III.B argues that they are not and that the 
Federal Circuit misapplied Powerex to the remand order in HIF Bio. 
B. Power Versus Discretion and the Remand Order in HIF  Bio 
1. Why Cohill Remands Are Not “Subject Matter Jurisdictional” Under § 
1447(c) 
Before Powerex, appellate courts reasoned that Cohill remands are not 
based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they are discretionary, not 
mandatory.190 The HIF Bio court effectively rejected this reasoning by 
concluding that the decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction constitutes 
a loss of judicial power and therefore requires remand for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.191 In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized the fact that 
every Cohill “remand necessarily involves a predicate finding that the claims at 
issue lack an independent basis of . . . jurisdiction.”192 In addition, the Federal 
Circuit distinguished abstention from the choice not to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction on the ground that a court abstains from hearing claims over which it 
 
187. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417 (emphasis omitted). See supra Part II.C.4 for a discussion 
of this component of the Powerex holding. 
188. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659, 666 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437). 
189. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2419 n.4 (emphasis added). 
190. See supra Part II.D.1 for an analysis of pre-Powerex decisions. Both prior to and after the 
enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, scholars took the position that Cohill remands 
were discretionary and not based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 
43 (noting remand of second claim depending on dropped first claim is not result of lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction); Steinman, supra note 45, at 962 (“[A] remand ordered as a matter of discretion 
not to exercise conceded judicial power is not a remand predicated on a lack of jurisdiction.”); 
Steinman, supra note 41, at 318 (noting § 1447(c) is inapplicable when courts, in their discretion, 
decline to exercise jurisdiction, because such action does not indicate that jurisdiction is lacking). 
191. See supra Part II.D.2 for a discussion of the HIF Bio opinion. 
192. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667. 
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has an independent basis of jurisdiction, while a court by definition does not 
have an independent basis of jurisdiction over the claims it declines to adjudicate 
under § 1367(c).193 According to the HIF Bio court, this difference in the two 
doctrines compels disparate treatment under § 1447(c) and (d).194 
The HIF Bio court, of course, is correct that supplemental claims by 
definition do not have an independent basis of jurisdiction—e.g., federal 
question or diversity. Furthermore, assuming that the Federal Circuit is correct 
that courts abstain only from deciding claims with an independent basis of 
subject matter jurisdiction,195 the court has undoubtedly identified a real 
 
193. See supra Part II.D.2 for further elaboration on the HIF Bio decision. 
194. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667. 
195. The exact nature of the relationship between abstention and § 1367(c) is unclear at best. 
Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CAL. L. REV. 
1409, 1421 & n.52 (1999) (noting relationship’s ambiguity and cataloging various positions taken by 
courts and scholars). If anything, comments by scholars, lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court 
have suggested that courts can abstain under § 1367(c). If this is true, then the HIF Bio court is 
incorrect that federal courts abstain only from deciding claims over which they have an independent 
basis of subject matter jurisdiction. 
 For example, in his commentary on the 1990 adoption of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 
Professor David D. Siegel stated that § 1367(c)(1) and (2) are “analogous” to Pullman and Burford 
abstention, “if not overlapping or duplicative” bases for declining jurisdiction. David D. Siegel, 
Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1367, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (2006) (noting changes to removal 
statute); see also David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the New (Dec. 1, 
1990) Judicial Improvements Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 67 (1991) (recognizing redundancy between § 
1367(c)(1) and (2) and abstention). Other scholars and some courts have taken a similar position. See 
White v. County of Newberry, 985 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1993) (treating § 1367(c) question as 
abstention issue); Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified Sch. Dist., No. S-91-0032WBS/PAN, 1992 WL 
361696, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 1992) (“[I]f it is not appropriate to abstain it is likewise not 
appropriate to decline the court’s supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.”); Patrick D. 
Murphy, A Federal Practitioner’s Guide to Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 78 
MARQ. L. REV. 973, 1024–25, 1028 n.288 (1995) (stating that § 1367(c)(1) is analogous to Pullman 
abstention, that declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) can be analogized to abstention 
under Burford, and that § 1367(c)(4) bears resemblance to Colorado River abstention); John B. 
Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial 
Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735, 766–68 (1991) (noting § 1367(a) and 
(c) incorporate abstention doctrine language and appear to limit discretion to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction); Robert A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1416 n.55 (2005) (noting resemblance between aims of § 1367(c)(1) and 
Pullman abstention); Joan Steinman, Section 1367—Another Party Heard From, 41 EMORY L.J. 85, 92 
(1992) (stating that § 1367(c)(1) “is redolent of language used in abstention cases”). 
 In 1997, the Supreme Court suggested in City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons that 
some relationship does indeed exist between abstention doctrines and § 1367(c). 522 U.S. 156, 173–74 
(1997). Specifically, the Court stated: 
 In addition to their discretion under § 1367(c), district courts may be obligated not to 
decide state law claims (or to stay their adjudication) where one of the abstention doctrines 
articulated by this Court applies. Those doctrines embody the general notion that “federal 
courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise exceptional circumstances, 
where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing interest         
. . . .” 
Id. at 174 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996)). 
 After the Court’s decision in College of Surgeons, scholars began to argue that § 1367(c)(4) 
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distinction between the two doctrines. This distinction, however, is immaterial. 
Instead, the crucial distinction is the difference between the existence of judicial 
power—i.e., subject matter jurisdiction—and the exercise of that power. The 
existence of judicial power is a yes or no question. The decision whether to 
exercise that power, on the other hand, is discretionary in both the abstention 
and supplemental jurisdiction contexts once certain criteria are satisfied.196 
 
codifies abstention principles. For example, in interpreting the Court’s statement in College of 
Surgeons, Professor Oakley focused on the Court’s quotation of the “exceptional 
circumstance”/“important countervailing interest” test for abstention and the similarity between this 
test and a court’s discretion to decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4) where “in exceptional 
circumstances, there are . . . compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006); 
THE AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT 93 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998). 
According to Professor Oakley, it appears that the “exceptional circumstances/compelling reasons” 
standard of “present § 1367(c)(4) . . . would permit supplemental jurisdiction to be declined as to any 
claim that absent such statutory discretion would be eligible for abstention under the virtually 
indistinguishable ‘exceptional circumstances/important countervailing interest’ test for when 
abstention is proper.” THE AM. LAW INST., supra, at 93. Other scholars and observers have made 
arguments similar to Professor Oakley’s. See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, Problems in Federal Forum 
Selection and Concurrent Federal State Jurisdiction: Supplemental Jurisdiction; Diversity Jurisdiction; 
Removal; Preemption; Venue; Transfer of Venue; Persona [sic] Jurisdiction; Abstention and the All 
Writs Act, SL081 ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials (2006) (stating that § 1367(c)(4) “would seem 
to include the following abstention formulas: cases where state law claims may be unclear – Pullman; 
cases involving state criminal proceedings – Younger; and, cases where the same parties are litigating 
the same issues in state court – Colorado River”); see also SST Global Tech., LLC v. Chapman, 270 F. 
Supp. 2d 444, 465–67 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding supplemental jurisdiction proper where forum was not 
inconvenient, abstention would not avoid piecemeal litigation, proceedings in federal forum would not 
be duplicative, state proceeding progressed further than federal proceeding, and where state forum 
provided sufficient protection for plaintiff’s interests); SST Global Tech., LLC, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 462–
63 (discussing Hays County Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
1087 (1993)); Joseph N. Akrotirianakis, Comment, Learning to Follow Directions: When District 
Courts Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), 31 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 995, 1026–27, 1029 (1998) (acknowledging legal scholars have argued that § 1367(c)(4) codifies 
Pullman, Burford, and Younger abstention and contending that Colorado River also permits courts to 
decline jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(4)). But see U.S. Fin. Corp. v. Warfield, 839 F. Supp. 684, 691 (D. 
Ariz. 1993) (explaining that court-formulated abstention doctrines do not trump statutory language of 
§ 1367(c)(4) requiring compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction). 
196. See Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006) (stating that subject matter 
jurisdiction “poses a ‘whether,’ not a ‘where’ question: Has the Legislature empowered the court to 
hear cases of a certain genre?”); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403–05 (1970). In Rosado, the 
Supreme Court found that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s state law claims even after the 
plaintiff’s federal claim became moot. 397 U.S. at 401–04. The Rosado Court “adhered to the position 
that when a federal court has power to adjudicate a state claim, the decision whether to exercise that 
jurisdiction is a matter of discretion.” Steinman, supra note 45, at 962 (discussing Rosado, 397 U.S. at 
403–05). Thus, the Court  
distinguished between the existence of judicial power and the exercise of that power. The 
first is a “yes or no” question as to whether jurisdiction exists; the second is merely a matter 
of discretion. Where there is power, a decision not to hear the state claim is purely a 
discretionary decision not to exercise that power. Hence, a remand ordered as a matter of 
discretion not to exercise conceded judicial power is not a remand predicated on a lack of 
jurisdiction.  
Id.; see also Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2004) (opinion of Easterbrook, 
J.) (stating that it is important to “distinguish between a decision that ‘[a] court lacks adjudicatory 
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a. Judicial Power 
“[S]ubject matter jurisdiction” is a court’s “statutory or constitutional power 
to adjudicate [a] case.”197 It is axiomatic that a federal court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over a claim only when both the U.S. Constitution and a federal 
statute provide the court with power to adjudicate the claim. For example, a 
claim falls within the federal question jurisdiction of a federal court only when 
both Article III of the Constitution and § 1331 authorize the court to adjudicate 
the claim. Similarly, a claim falls within the supplemental jurisdiction of a federal 
court only when both Article III and § 1367(a) authorize adjudication.198 When a 
civil action is filed in or removed to federal court, the constitutional and 
statutory requirements for subject matter jurisdiction either are satisfied or they 
are not, and judicial power either exists or it does not. 
b. The Discretionary Decision Whether to Exercise Judicial Power:  
 Abstention and Supplemental Jurisdiction 
Generally, when the jurisdiction of a federal court is properly invoked, the 
court has a “strict duty” to adjudicate the controversy.199 This “duty” derives 
from the “undisputed constitutional principle that Congress, and not the 
Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within the constitutionally 
permissible bounds.”200 Nevertheless, the federal courts’ obligation to decide 
cases is not “absolute.”201 The Supreme Court has long held that federal courts 
have the power to abstain in certain cases.202 Under the abstention doctrines, 
 
competence’ and a decision that ‘[a] court has been authorized to do X and having done so should bow 
out’” because “[t]he former implies lack of subject-matter jurisdiction . . .; the latter implies the 
presence of jurisdiction”), rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 633 (2006); Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850 (stating 
that “a suit under federal law with a state-law claim supported by . . . supplemental jurisdiction” is 
“good example” of category in which court has adjudicatory competence but is authorized to decline 
to exercise its power and “having done so should bow out”); Mark Herrmann, Thermtron Revisited: 
When and How Federal Trial Court Remand Orders Are Reviewable, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395, 420–21 
(1987) (arguing that it is inaccurate to describe pendent jurisdiction as discretionary and that it is 
preferable to describe federal courts as having jurisdiction over claims which they may decline to 
adjudicate). 
197. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); see also Powerex Corp. v. 
Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2007) (stating that “subject matter jurisdiction” is 
the “power to adjudicate . . . claims”); Dodson, supra note 41, at 59 (defining jurisdiction as court’s 
authority “to issue legitimate, binding, and enforceable orders”). 
198. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c). See supra note 41 for a discussion of requirements for falling within 
the ambit of § 1367(a). 
199. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716; see also Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (stating that federal courts have “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to 
exercise the jurisdiction given them”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (“We 
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not 
given.”). 
200. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (citing 
Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922)). 
201. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716. 
202. See, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 813–17 (discussing different categories of abstention and 
citing many cases in which Supreme Court has approved of abstention). 
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“federal courts may decline to exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise 
exceptional circumstances, where denying a federal forum would clearly serve an 
important countervailing interest.”203 The Supreme Court has “located the 
power to abstain in the historic discretion exercised by federal courts sitting in 
equity,” but it has also “recognized that the authority of a federal court to 
abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in which the court has 
discretion to grant or deny relief.”204 
Similarly, the decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction that 
exists under § 1367(a) is discretionary once a court has determined that § 1367(c) 
is satisfied. Section 1367(a) states: “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) 
or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute,” the district courts “shall 
have supplemental jurisdiction” when the statute is properly invoked.205 The 
mandatory language in § 1367(a)—“shall have supplemental jurisdiction”—
indicates that the court has a duty to adjudicate the supplemental claims before 
it. Section 1367(a) makes it clear, however, that the court’s duty is not 
absolute.206 Subsection (b) provides that in diversity cases, the district courts 
“shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)” over particular 
claims. Thus, in certain cases subsection (b) specifically withdraws the 
jurisdiction granted under subsection (a).207 
In contrast, under subsection (c) a district court “may decline to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a)” if one of the criteria 
 
203. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 716 (internal quotation marks omitted). When a federal court 
abstains, it either: (1) declines to exercise its jurisdiction altogether by remanding a removed case to 
state court or dismissing the case outright, or (2) “postpones” the exercise of its jurisdiction by staying 
the federal proceedings and remitting the parties to a state court. See, e.g., id. at 731 (“[F]ederal courts 
have the power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only where the relief being 
sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary.”); La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 
U.S. 25, 30–31 (1959) (affirming district court’s stay of proceedings on abstention grounds); Burford v. 
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 333–36 (1943) (affirming district court’s dismissal of complaint on 
abstention grounds). 
204. Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 718 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the 
past, it has been unclear whether, for example, “Pullman abstention is mandatory or discretionary.” 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 795 (5th ed. 2007). In other words, it has been 
uncertain whether a court is obligated to abstain if the requirements for abstention are satisfied or 
whether a court can decide to exercise jurisdiction even if the requirements for abstention are 
satisfied. According to Dean Chemerinsky, “[t]he preferable approach is to treat abstention as 
discretionary and to allow federal courts to hear the case, even if the Pullman criteria are met, 
provided substantial reasons for avoiding abstention are present.” Id. As noted above, the Court 
stated in Quackenbush, its most recent abstention decision, that abstention is “derive[d] from the 
discretion historically enjoyed by courts of equity.” 517 U.S. at 728; see also Burford, 319 U.S. at 317–
18 (describing court’s choice of whether to abstain as matter of discretion). Thus, the better conclusion 
is that the decision whether to abstain is a discretionary one. 
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
206. See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Federal Judicial Code 
Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 938–39 (1998) (arguing that § 1367(a)’s language 
granting liberal supplemental jurisdiction is meant to be limited only by exceptions enumerated in 
other federal statutes or subsections (b) and (c) of § 1367). 
207. See id. at 943 (distinguishing § 1367(b) from § 1367(c) by noting that § 1367(b) serves to 
withdraw jurisdiction authorized by § 1367(a)). 
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enumerated in subsection (c) is satisfied.208 Subsection (c), unlike subsection (b), 
does not withdraw the jurisdiction granted in subsection (a).209 Instead, 
subsection (c) authorizes a district court to decline to exercise the power that it 
has under subsection (a) if subsection (c) is satisfied and the court chooses not to 
exercise its power. The court may, but is not obligated to, decline to exercise its 
supplemental power.210 Thus, contrary to the HIF Bio court’s conclusion, the 
plain language of subsection (c) demonstrates that it is not an express statutory 
exception to subsection (a). Instead, when a court declines to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c), as when it abstains, the court is 
making a discretionary decision not to exercise existing judicial power.211 The 
court has both constitutional and statutory authority to adjudicate the claim but 
chooses not to use its power. 
Furthermore, jurisdiction does not evaporate at the moment a court 
declines to exercise its supplemental power.212 Once a court has determined that 
 
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (emphasis added). Section 1367(c) specifically provides that a court may 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issues of 
State law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims” within the court’s original 
jurisdiction, “(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) 
in exceptional circumstances.” Id. 
 The circuits are divided regarding whether § 1367(c) codifies the broad discretionary approach 
under Gibbs or is limited to only the criteria listed therein. Compare, e.g., Borough of W. Mifflin v. 
Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that district court can decline to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) for reasons of convenience, fairness, judicial economy, and 
comity, as set forth in Gibbs), with Executive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 
1556 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that district court can decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction 
under § 1367(c) only for reasons listed in statute), overruled by Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. Powerex 
Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008). In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, a case 
decided after Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Supreme Court suggested 
that the Gibbs approach is the proper one when it stated: “[Section 1367] . . . reflects the 
understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, ‘a federal court 
should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial 
economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon 
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). See generally Rachel Ellen Hinkle, Comment, The Revision 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the Debate over the District Court’s Discretion to Decline Supplemental 
Jurisdiction, 69 TENN. L. REV. 111, 120–36 (2001) (discussing circuit split). 
209. Oakley, supra note 204, at 943 (arguing that § 1367(c) “seeks . . . to resurrect the element of 
judicial discretion in the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction that the mandatory phrasing of 
subsection 1367(a) needlessly extinguished”). 
210. See Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. at 172 (“Of course, to say that the terms of § 1367(a) 
authorize the district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims . . . does not 
mean that the jurisdiction must be exercised in all cases.”). 
211. See Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 6 F.3d 856, 860 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Because 
abstention, by definition, assumes the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in the abstaining court—
after all, one must have . . . subject matter jurisdiction in order to decline the exercise of it—section 
1447(c) does not apply to an abstention-driven remand.”), rejected by Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 517 U.S. 706, 712–15 (1996); Siegel, supra note 132 (stating that decision whether to remand 
supplemental claim after main claim has been disposed of on merits is, like abstention, discretionary). 
212. This argument is derived from Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 373 F.3d 847, 849–50 (7th Cir. 
2004) (opinion of Easterbrook, J.), rev’d on other grounds, 547 U.S. 633 (2006). In Kircher, the 
plaintiffs sued an investment fund and its adviser in state court for misconduct under state law. 373 
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§ 1367(c) is applicable and that it will exercise its discretion not to adjudicate a 
supplemental claim, there is nothing left for the court to do except remand or 
dismiss the claim. The remand does not result from a lack of jurisdiction but 
instead from the court’s decision not to exercise its existing judicial authority. 
Accordingly, remands under § 1367(c), like abstention-based remands, are not 
subject matter jurisdictional. 
Finally, the Supreme Court has stated that the decision whether to decline 
to exercise pendent or supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary. Prior to the 
enactment of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Gibbs Court said that 
pendent jurisdiction “need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to 
exist. It . . . is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.”213 After Gibbs, the 
Cohill Court held that a district court had the discretion to remand pendent 
claims once the federal claim was eliminated, not that the court was required to 
 
F.3d at 847. The defendants removed the suit under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998. Id. at 848. 
 The district court remanded the case for lack of jurisdiction. Id. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit 
concluded that § 1447(c) and (d) did not insulate the remand order from appellate review because the 
removal itself was jurisdictionally proper and no postremoval events “undercut the propriety of the 
removal.” Id. at 851. Instead, according to the Seventh Circuit, the “only pertinent development” 
postremoval was that the district court made a “substantive decision” under SLUSA that remand was 
appropriate for nonjurisdictional reasons. Id. at 849, 851. The appellate court reasoned that once the 
district court made its substantive decision, it “had nothing else to do: dismissal and remand [were] the 
only options.” Kircher, 373 F.3d at 849–50. 
 The court recognized that it was possible to conclude “that jurisdiction evaporated at that 
juncture,” but rejected this conclusion. Id. at 850. The court emphasized the distinction between the 
decision that “‘[a] court lacks adjudicatory competence’ and a decision that ‘[a] court has been 
authorized to do X and having done so should bow out.’” Id. In the latter situation, the court has “no 
adjudicatory competence to do more,” but it “is not the ‘lack of subject-matter jurisdiction’ that 
authorizes a remand. Otherwise every federal suit, having been decided on the merits, would be 
dismissed ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ because the court’s job was finished.” Id. 
 According to the court, remands under § 1367(c) are a “good example” of the second category: a 
court has adjudicatory competence under § 1367(a), but once it decides not to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (c), it should bow out. Id. The remand, however, is not for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction simply because the court’s job is finished. Kircher, 373 F.3d at 850. 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that once the district court in Kircher made the substantive 
decision that remand was appropriate, its only options were remand and dismissal. Id. at 849–50. That 
did not mean, however, that the remand was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction just because the 
court had finished its work. Id. at 850. 
 On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the district court’s remand order was, in fact, based on 
a lack of jurisdiction and therefore it was immune from appellate review under § 1447(c) and (d). 
Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 642–44 (2006). The Court noted that the only 
adjudicatory competence the district court had was the power to determine if it actually had 
jurisdiction to proceed with the case. Id. at 644. Because the Court concluded that judicial power never 
existed in Kircher, once the district court decided that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the remand 
order necessarily fell within § 1447(c) and (d). Id. at 645–48. Although the Supreme Court overruled 
the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the remand order was reviewable on appeal, the Court neither 
called into question nor even addressed the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning that there is a distinction 
between the existence of judicial power and the decision whether to exercise it. The Court simply did 
not reach this issue because it concluded that judicial power never existed. Id. at 646–48. 
213. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 
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do so because of a jurisdictional defect.214 And this discretion “enable[d] district 
courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that best serves 
the principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity which underlie the 
pendent jurisdiction doctrine.”215 
Then, in International College of Surgeons, a case interpreting the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute, the Court said that § 1367(c) “confirms the 
discretionary nature of supplemental jurisdiction by enumerating the 
circumstances in which district courts can refuse its exercise.”216 The Court 
quoted Gibbs for the proposition that “pendent jurisdiction ‘is a doctrine of 
discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.’”217 The Court also acknowledged that 
although “the terms of § 1367(a) authorize the district courts to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims,” that “does not mean that the 
jurisdiction must be exercised in all cases.”218 Finally, relying on Cohill, the 
International College of Surgeons Court concluded that § 1367(c) “reflects the 
understanding that, when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, 
‘a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the 
litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’”219 
Thus, although the Court has never directly “passed on” whether Cohill remands 
are subject matter jurisdictional, the Court has never suggested that the decision 
whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is anything other than 
discretionary once § 1367(c) is satisfied. 
c. Application to HIF Bio220 
In HIF Bio, the removal was jurisdictionally proper. Thus, judicial power 
existed for the federal court to adjudicate the claims before it. In its remand 
order, the district court decided that the two declaratory judgment claims were 
state rather than federal claims.221 The district court also dismissed the federal 
RICO claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.222 At 
that point, there was no question that the district court retained jurisdiction to 
decide the supplemental state law claims.223 The district court declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims under § 1367(c)(2), 
 
214. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). 
215. Id. 
216. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (emphasis added). 
217. Id. at 172 (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726). 
218. Id. 
219. Id. at 173 (quoting Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350). 
220. See supra Part II.D.2 for a detailed explanation of the district court’s remand order and the 
Federal Circuit’s opinion. 
221. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659, 664 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437). 
222. Id. at 662. 
223. E.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403–05 (1970) (finding federal jurisdiction for 
supplemental state law claims proper where federal claim was dismissed); see also Steinman, supra 
note 45, at 963 (noting that federal courts retain jurisdiction to adjudicate supplemental state claims 
even after dismissal of federal question claims). 
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however, because they predominated over the federal claim and therefore 
belonged in state court.224 Thus, the court decided in its discretion not to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims and to remand them to state court.225 
There was no lack of subject matter jurisdiction—i.e., judicial power—requiring 
the court to remand. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 
1367(c)(2)—a discretionary decision—given the circumstances of the case. 
2. Powerex and the Remand Order in HIF Bio 
Under Powerex, an appellate court should determine if a remand order is 
subject matter jurisdictional and therefore immune from appellate review by (1) 
examining the remand order to determine how the district court characterized 
the remand; and (2) if the district court characterized the remand as subject 
matter jurisdictional, looking behind the remand order to determine if that 
characterization is colorable.226 This section explains how the Federal Circuit 
misapplied the Powerex test in HIF Bio and concludes that under Powerex, the 
Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s Cohill 
remand. 
The first step under Powerex is to determine whether the district court in 
HIF Bio characterized the remand as subject matter jurisdictional, which in turn 
requires a careful examination of the remand order.227 This task is complicated 
in HIF Bio, however, because the district court stated in subsection 1 of its 
Analysis that it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all 
eleven state claims in the complaint, but then concluded in subsection 2 that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the two declaratory judgment claims.228 
The court stated that it was remanding all of the claims, but it did not clarify 
whether it was remanding the declaratory judgment claims because it lacked 
jurisdiction over them or because it had declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over them.229 
One way to reconcile these statements is to conclude that the plaintiffs 
actually asserted thirteen state claims in the complaint.230 If that is the case, then 
 
224. See supra Part II.D.2 for a discussion of the district court’s decision in HIF Bio. The district 
court also could have declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(3) because the 
federal claim had been eliminated. 
225. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 664. 
226. See supra Part II.C.4 for a discussion of the analysis used in Powerex. 
227. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2007). 
228. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the district court’s 
decision to decline exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims and its conclusion that it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claims.  
229. See supra notes 146–52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the district court’s 
decision to remand all claims without clarification about whether the court lacked or simply declined 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment claims.  
230. The district court did not specifically count the state claims in the complaint. Instead, in the 
first part of its remand order it said that the plaintiffs sought “declaratory judgment with respect to 
ownership and inventorship” of the anticancer agent. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 
No. CV 05-07976, 2006 WL 6086295, at *2, *4 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2006). It also stated that the plaintiffs 
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the district court remanded the two declaratory judgment claims for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, but remanded the eleven other state claims after 
deciding not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. Another possibility 
is that the plaintiffs asserted only eleven state claims in the complaint (including 
the two for declaratory relief), and the district court remanded all of the claims 
after deciding not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any of them. If that 
is the case, then the district court must have concluded that, although the two 
claims for declaratory relief did not have an independent basis of jurisdiction, 
they were supplemental to the RICO claim under § 1367(a), just like the nine 
other state claims, and it could decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
them as well. There does not seem to be any doubt that the declaratory judgment 
claims were supplemental to the RICO claim, but the district court never said so 
explicitly or clearly stated that it was remanding them based on its decision not 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. 
The Federal Circuit concluded that the latter interpretation of the district 
court’s remand order was correct and characterized the district court as 
“declining supplemental jurisdiction” over all of the state claims in HIF Bio.231 
The court does not appear to have analyzed whether the district court actually 
characterized the remand order as subject matter jurisdictional. Nevertheless, 
the court “looked behind” the remand order to determine whether Cohill 
 
had asserted a RICO claim and claims for “slander, conversion, actual and constructive fraud, 
intentional and negligent interference with contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, 
breach of implied contract, unfair competition and fraudulent business practices, unjust enrichment 
and constructive trust.” Id. at *2. The district court then noted that the plaintiffs also sought a 
permanent injunction. Id. In subsection 1 of its Analysis, the district court referred to the complaint as 
containing “twelve causes of action, eleven of which are state claims.” Id. at *3. 
 The Federal Circuit concluded that the complaint contained eleven causes of action by counting 
them as follows: 
The first and second causes of action seek a declaratory judgment for ownership and 
inventorship . . . . The third cause of action asserts violations of [RICO]. The remaining nine 
causes of action are based respectively on slander of title; conversion; actual and constructive 
fraud; intentional interference with contractual relations and prospective economic 
advantage; negligent interference with contractual relations and prospective economic 
advantage; breach of implied contract; unfair competition and fraudulent business practices; 
unjust enrichment-constructive trust; and permanent injunction. 
HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 662 (citations omitted). 
 It is possible to conclude that there were thirteen claims or causes of action by counting them as 
follows: (1) declaratory judgment for ownership, (2) declaratory judgment for inventorship, (3) 
slander, (4) conversion, (5) actual fraud, (6) constructive fraud, (7) intentional interference with 
contractual relations and prospective economic advantage, (8) negligent interference with contractual 
relations and prospective economic advantage, (9) breach of implied contract, (10) unfair competition 
and fraudulent business practices, (11) unjust enrichment, (12) constructive trust, and (13) request for 
permanent injunction. Id. Alternatively, the unfair competition and fraudulent business practices 
“claim” could be counted as two separate claims and the request for a permanent injunction could be 
viewed as a remedy and not a cause of action. Yet another possibility is that unfair competition and 
fraudulent business practices can be counted as two claims, but unjust enrichment and constructive 
trust should be counted as one claim and the request for a permanent injunction should also be 
counted as a claim. Under any of these scenarios, the plaintiffs actually asserted thirteen claims. 
231. 508 F.3d at 664. 
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remands are based on a defect in subject matter jurisdiction or can be “colorably 
characterized” as such and therefore fall within the class of remands barred from 
appellate review.232 After the Federal Circuit concluded (incorrectly) that Cohill 
remands fall within § 1447(c) and (d), it held that it lacked jurisdiction over 
CTI’s appeal.233 As explained below, the Federal Circuit incorrectly applied the 
Powerex test to the Cohill remand in HIF Bio and erred in concluding that it 
lacked jurisdiction to review the remand order.234 
 
232. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the HIF Bio court’s 
process for determining the nature of the district court’s decision to remand the claims. 
233. See supra notes 158–72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s 
holding. 
234. This conclusion and the subsequent analysis assume that the district court in HIF Bio 
remanded all of the state law claims pursuant to § 1367(c). The district court, however, did not clearly 
state the basis for its remand of the declaratory judgment claims; it simply stated that it was remanding 
them. Based on the district court’s statement in subsection 1 of its Analysis that it was declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over “all” of the state claims, it seems most likely that the district 
court remanded the declaratory judgment claims on that basis. If that is the case, then as explained 
above the entire remand order in HIF Bio is reviewable on appeal. 
 It is possible to argue, however, that the district court remanded the declaratory judgment claims 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction—or at least the remand order can be characterized in that way—
and therefore they are unreviewable on appeal. The resolution of this issue matters because the 
defendant argued that the declaratory judgment claims arose under patent law and the federal court 
therefore had exclusive jurisdiction over them. HIF Bio, Inc., 2006 WL 6086295, at *4. If the remand of 
these claims is reviewable on appeal, then the Federal Circuit may agree with the defendant and 
conclude that these claims belong in federal court. On the other hand, if the remand of these claims is 
unreviewable, a state court will try them even if a federal court is the only court that is competent to 
hear them. 
 Powerex does not address the circumstance where the basis for the remand is unclear. In 
Powerex, there was no question that the district court was purporting to remand because it believed it 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against Powerex once it concluded that the other 
third-party defendants were immune from suit. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 127 S. Ct. 
2411, 2414–15 (2007). The Court had never actually decided whether a remand in these circumstances 
was required due to a defect in subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 2418. The point was “debatable,” 
however, and thus the district court’s characterization of the remand as subject matter jurisdictional 
was colorable. Id. In contrast, in HIF Bio it is unclear whether the district court was purporting to 
remand the declaratory judgment claims under § 1367(c) or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
There is no question, however, that the district court could have remanded the declaratory judgment 
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction once it concluded that they did not arise under patent law. 
In other words, if the district court characterized the remand of the declaratory judgment claims as 
subject matter jurisdictional, then that characterization is certainly colorable. 
 Although Powerex itself does not resolve the question of whether the remand of the declaratory 
judgment claims in HIF Bio is reviewable on appeal, the Powerex Court’s rationale may provide some 
guidance. The Powerex Court reasoned that “[l]engthy appellate disputes about whether an arguable 
jurisdictional ground invoked by the district court was properly such would frustrate the purpose of § 
1447(d).” Id. Thus, the Court adopted the “colorably characterized” test because it believed that it 
would limit litigation regarding appellate review of remand orders. 
 Applying the Powerex rationale to the remand of the declaratory judgment claims in HIF Bio 
leads to the conclusion that because the district court arguably characterized the basis for its remand 
of those claims as subject matter jurisdictional and because that basis is colorable, the remand of the 
declaratory judgment claims should be immune from appellate review. This solution, in effect, would 
amend the Powerex test to ask (1) whether the district court arguably characterized its remand as 
subject matter jurisdictional; and (2) if so, whether that characterization is colorable. Under the 
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The initial question under Powerex is whether the district court 
characterized the remand as subject matter jurisdictional. In answering this 
question, the Federal Circuit simply stated that the district court declined 
supplemental jurisdiction over all of the state claims in HIF Bio.235 The court did 
not carefully examine the remand order, as required under Powerex,236 to 
determine if the district court actually characterized the remand as subject 
matter jurisdictional. 
First, contrary to the Federal Circuit’s contention, the district court did not 
say that it was “declining supplemental jurisdiction” over the state claims.237 
Instead, in subsection 1 of its Analysis, the district court specifically said that it 
was “declin[ing] to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over the eleven state 
claims in the complaint.238 Section 1367(c) provides that a district court “may 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” if § 1367(c) is satisfied. A court 
cannot “decline supplemental jurisdiction” under § 1367(c) because the existence 
of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a)—i.e., judicial power—is a yes or no 
question.239 The decision whether to exercise that power, however, is 
discretionary.240 The remand order in HIF Bio was based on the district court’s 
discretionary decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because 
the state law claims predominated over the federal claim.241 It was not based on 
the decision to “decline jurisdiction,” a decision that the district court was 
without power to make since the claims fell within its § 1367(a) jurisdiction. 
Second, the remand order in Powerex stated that “the remand ‘issue 
hinge[d] . . . on the Court’s jurisdictional authority to hear the removed claims,’” 
and the district court “repeatedly stated” in its order denying a stay of remand 
that “a lack of subject matter jurisdiction required remand pursuant to § 
1447(c).”242 In contrast, the remand order in HIF Bio did not indicate that the 
district court was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because it 
 
Powerex rationale, this revised test should avoid lengthy appellate disputes about both whether the 
district court characterized its remand order as subject matter jurisdictional and whether an arguable 
jurisdictional ground is properly such. And under this revised test, the remand of the declaratory 
judgment claims in HIF Bio is not subject to appellate review. 
235. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 662. 
236. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417. 
237. The HIF Bio court repeatedly and incorrectly used the phrase “declining supplemental 
jurisdiction.” E.g., 508 F.3d at 664 (“In this case, the district court’s remand order is based on declining 
supplemental jurisdiction.”); id. at 665 (“[W]e are faced with an issue of first impression for this court: 
whether a remand based on declining supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is within the class of 
remands described in § 1447(c).”); id. at 667 (“[A] remand based on declining supplemental 
jurisdiction can be colorably characterized as a remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”). 
238. HIF Bio, Inc., 2006 WL 6086295, at *3 (emphasis added). 
239. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the relation between subject matter jurisdiction 
and supplemental claims. 
240. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion of the discretionary nature of supplemental 
jurisdiction. 
241. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 664. 
242. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2007). 
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lacked power over the state law claims.243 Instead, the district court made it clear 
that it was declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the state 
claims predominated over the federal RICO claim and therefore state court was 
the proper forum in which to litigate them.244 Thus, the district court in HIF Bio 
in no way characterized the Cohill remand as subject matter jurisdictional. 
Under Powerex, because the district court did not characterize the Cohill 
remand in HIF Bio as based on a defect in subject matter jurisdiction, the 
Federal Circuit should not have “looked behind” the remand order (step two of 
the Powerex analysis)245 to determine whether Cohill remands are subject matter 
jurisdictional. Instead, the Federal Circuit should have concluded that the 
remand did not fall within § 1447(c) and that the review bar of § 1447(d) 
therefore did not apply. At that point, the Federal Circuit should have turned to 
the merits of the appeal. 
If the district court in HIF Bio had actually characterized the remand of the 
state claims under § 1367(c) as subject matter jurisdictional, then it would have 
been appropriate for the Federal Circuit to proceed to the question of whether 
such a characterization is colorable. In Powerex, it was debatable whether there 
was actually a defect in subject matter jurisdiction that required remand, but that 
was enough for the Court to conclude that the district court’s characterization of 
its remand as subject matter jurisdictional was colorable. In contrast, if a district 
court were to characterize or attempt to characterize a Cohill remand as based 
on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the characterization would not be 
colorable because, although the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether 
Cohill remands are subject matter jurisdictional, the issue is not debatable. 
As explained in Part III.B.1 above, both the language of the supplemental 
jurisdiction statute and Supreme Court precedent demonstrate that the decision 
whether to exercise supplemental power that exists under § 1367(a) is 
discretionary once § 1367(c) is satisfied. And if a court declines to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction and remands the claims, the remand is based on the 
court’s use of its discretion, not a jurisdictional defect. Jurisdiction does not 
evaporate at the moment a court decides not exercise its supplemental 
jurisdiction. Thus, the Supreme Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and 
hold that the appellate court has jurisdiction to review the Cohill remand in HIF 
Bio. More broadly, the Court should hold that any characterization of Cohill 
remands as subject matter jurisdictional under § 1447(c) is not colorable, and 
therefore such remands are reviewable on appeal under the Court’s current 
interpretation of § 1447(c) and (d). 
 
243. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 662. 
244. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., No. CV 05-07976, 2006 WL 6086295, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. June 9, 2006). The district court did not actually cite § 1367(c) as the basis for its decision 
not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction; however, § 1367(c)(2) permits a district court to decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction where the state law claims “substantially predominate[] over the 
claim or claims over which the district court has [an independent basis of jurisdiction].” 28 U.S.C. § 
1367 (c)(2) (2006). Thus, § 1367(c)(2) obviously was the basis for the district court’s decision not to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 
245. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417. 
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C. The Remand of Claims and Cases Under § 1447(c) 
After concluding that Cohill remands are based on a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, the HIF Bio court automatically assumed that they therefore fall 
“within the class of remands described in § 1447(c), and thus barred from 
appellate review by § 1447(d).”246 Even if the Supreme Court ultimately 
concludes that Cohill remands can be colorably characterized as remands for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, they will not necessarily fall within § 
1447(c). Section 1447(c) can be interpreted to encompass only those remands 
that are based on lack of subject matter over an entire case, and not remands, 
like those under § 1367(c), that involve remand of only a claim or claims. 
Section 1447(c) states in pertinent part: “If at any time before final 
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the 
case shall be remanded.”247 Noticeably absent from § 1447(c) is the definition of 
precisely what it must appear that the district court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over before the case must be remanded. Two options logically 
present themselves. The first is that if the district court appears to lack 
jurisdiction over a “claim,” then the court must remand the whole case. The 
second is that if the district court appears to lack jurisdiction over the “case,” 
then the court must remand the whole case. 
A “civil action” or “case” is commonly understood to “encompass . . . only 
the claims that are [both] permitted by the governing Rules [of Civil Procedure 
to be brought within a single litigation] and . . . supported either by an 
independent basis of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . or by supplemental 
jurisdiction.”248 Thus, the term “case” refers to all of the claims properly asserted 
in a single action, while the term “claim” refers to one part of a case.249 There is 
no doubt that should a court determine that it does not have an independent 
basis of jurisdiction over even a single claim in a complaint, the entire case must 
be remanded and the remand order would fall within § 1447(c).250 If § 1447(c) is 
interpreted to apply where a court has an independent basis of jurisdiction over 
one claim but remands one or more other claims for lack of jurisdiction, 
however, then the plain language of § 1447(c) requires the court to remand the 
entire “case” in these circumstances, too. 
In the context of Cohill remands, this interpretation of § 1447(c) is quite 
problematic. First, the plain language of § 1367(c) itself permits a court to 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over supplemental claims, but it 
 
246. HIF Bio, Inc., 508 F.3d at 667. 
 247.  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 
248. Joan Steinman, Claims, Civil Actions, Congress & the Court: Limiting the Reasoning of 
Cases Construing Poorly Drawn Statutes, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1593, 1605 (2008). 
249. See id. at 1607–08 (illustrating many different contexts in which courts distinguish between 
claim and civil action). Of course, “a single claim can constitute a civil action [or case] and does so 
when it is the sole claim asserted between the parties” and has an independent basis of subject matter 
jurisdiction. Id. at 1609. 
250. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (stating federal court is required to 
dismiss complaint entirely upon concluding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction). 
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does not authorize a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over claims with 
independent bases of jurisdiction.251 Second, with regard to remands under § 
1367(c)(1), (2), and (4), this interpretation of § 1447(c) would require a court to 
remand claims with independent bases of jurisdiction. For example, if a district 
court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim 
under § 1367(c)(1)—because “the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State 
law”—and treated this remand as one for lack of jurisdiction, then § 1447(c) 
would mandate that the district court remand the whole case, including the 
claims over which the district court had independent bases of jurisdiction. The 
same analysis would apply if the district court declined to exercise its 
supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c)(2) or (c)(4). Such results would 
certainly flout the “virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to 
exercise the jurisdiction given them.”252 
If a district court declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a 
state law claim under § 1367(c)(3) because it had “dismissed all claims over 
which it ha[d] original jurisdiction,” then § 1447(c) would still mandate remand 
of the entire case. In this circumstance, however, all that would remain of the 
“case” would be the state law claim, and the district court would not be required 
to remand claims with independent bases of jurisdiction in order to remand the 
“case.” Thus, it is conceivable that the Supreme Court will conclude that only 
remands pursuant to § 1367(c)(3)—and not remands under § 1367(c)(1), (2), and 
(4)—constitute remands for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that fall within § 
1447(c) and (d). However, such a conclusion would conflict with the HIF Bio 
court’s reasoning that a court loses jurisdiction over the supplemental claims 
when it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because § 1367(c) is an 
express statutory exception to § 1367(a).253 Under HIF Bio, the reason for a 
district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is irrelevant.254 
Once the district court makes the decision, it loses jurisdiction over the claim. 
The more plausible interpretation of § 1447(c) is that it requires a district 
court to remand a “case” only when it appears that it lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction over the whole case, and not just a claim. If a “case” is understood to 
comprise all of the claims in a lawsuit,255 then only if the court determines that it 
is without jurisdiction over all claims in the suit must the entire case be 
 
251. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 41, at 318 (noting while § 1447(c) requires remand of entire 
case, § 1367(c) allows court to refuse jurisdiction for only those claims encompassed by supplemental 
jurisdiction, not those with independent basis for federal court’s jurisdiction). 
252. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). See supra 
notes 203–09 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discretionary nature of this exercise of 
jurisdiction. 
253. HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharm. Indus. Co., 508 F.3d 659, 667 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. 
granted sub nom. Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 395 (Oct. 14, 2008) (No. 07-1437). 
254. See id. at 662–63 (noting district court may validly decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction for any number of reasons). 
255. See Joan Steinman, Crosscurrents: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Removal, and the ALI 
Revision Project, 74 IND. L.J. 75, 87 (1998) (discussing distinction between claims and actions, namely, 
that single action may include several claims asserted by same or different parties). See supra notes 
247–48 and accompanying text for an analysis of the term “case.” 
  
2008] REMAND AND APPELLATE REVIEW 1113 
 
remanded. For example, if a court discovers before final judgment that it never 
had an independent basis of jurisdiction over any claim, then removal was 
improper under § 1441(a) and § 1447(c) requires remand of the entire case for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
This interpretation of § 1447(c) not only prevents a district court from 
having to remand claims with an independent basis of jurisdiction under § 
1447(c), it is also consistent with Powerex. The Powerex Court said that even if 
removal is proper, postremoval events can result in a remand for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction.256 The Court did not define the type of postremoval events 
that can result in a § 1447(c) remand, but it did rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) in 
reaching its conclusion.257 Under § 1447(e), if joinder of a party postremoval 
would destroy complete diversity and thereby deprive the court of jurisdiction 
over the case, then the court must either refuse to join the party or “remand the 
action.”258 As the Powerex Court said, § 1447(e) “unambiguously demonstrates 
that a case can be properly removed and yet suffer from a failing in subject-
matter jurisdiction that requires remand.”259 The Powerex Court also made it 
clear that § 1447(e) remands are immune from appellate review.260 
Consequently, § 1447(e) demonstrates that it is possible to interpret § 1447(c) to 
require a court to lack jurisdiction over a case before the remand falls within § 
1447(c) and reconcile that interpretation with Powerex. 
Under this more plausible interpretation of § 1447(c), even if the Court 
concludes that Cohill remands are remands for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, they would not fall within § 1447(c) because the court would lack 
jurisdiction over only a claim or claims and not the whole case. Furthermore, 
because § 1447(c) and (d) must be read together under Thermtron and its 
progeny,261 if § 1447(c) does not cover Cohill remands (even if they are based on 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction), then § 1447(d) would be inapplicable and 
Cohill remands would remain reviewable on appeal. 
D. Consequences 
The enactment of § 1447(d) and the Supreme Court’s continued reading of 
§ 1447(c) and (d) together have led to a “strange concatenation of results.”262 If 
the Court concludes that Cohill remands are immune from appellate review, this 
decision will produce additional strange results. Furthermore, there would be 
significant systemic consequences to a determination that remands under § 
1367(c), a traditionally nonjurisdictional basis for remand, are now jurisdictional. 
 
256. Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2411, 2416–17 (2007). 
257. Id. 
258. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (2006) (emphasis added). 
259. Powerex Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 2417 (first emphasis added). 
260. Id. 
261. See supra Part II.B.2 for a discussion of Thermtron and its progeny.  
262. See Steinman, supra note 43, at 953 (arguing that federal court’s ability to grant appellate 
review to some state claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction but not others creates “oddity”). 
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Currently, if a district court dismisses a claim for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, it is reviewable on appeal de novo. If a district court remands a claim 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, however, it is unreviewable. There is no 
apparent reason for this dichotomy. According to the Court, the goal of § 
1447(d) is to prevent litigation over which of two competent court systems will 
resolve a dispute. If this is a worthwhile goal, then it is unclear why Congress has 
not enacted a ban on appellate review of dismissals for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, at least where a state forum is available to the plaintiff. 
Furthermore, at least until HIF Bio was decided, all circuits that had 
addressed the issue held that Cohill remands are reviewable on appeal.263 This 
led to the odd circumstance that discretionary remands are subject to appellate 
review (except now in the Federal Circuit) while remands for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction are not. This is a “perverse” result “because discretionary 
decisions, by their very nature, are such that different judges may reasonably 
come to different conclusions.”264 Appellate review of discretionary decisions 
“therefore would seem less essential than review of nondiscretionary conclusions 
as to jurisdiction, based upon holdings of law.”265 
If the Supreme Court decides that Cohill remands are immune from 
appellate review, it will eliminate the dichotomy created by permitting review of 
discretionary remands and banning review of nondiscretionary remands, but the 
Court will create additional anomalies. First, Cohill remands will no longer be 
subject to appellate review, but § 1367(c) dismissals will remain reviewable on 
appeal.266 Second, if Cohill remands are based on a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, then courts presumably will consider § 1367(c) dismissals to be 
based on a lack of jurisdiction as well. As a result, § 1367(c) dismissals will 
become reviewable on appeal de novo, while Cohill remands will receive no 
appellate scrutiny whatsoever. 
 
263. See supra Part II.D.1 for further discussion of these decisions. 
264. Steinman, supra note 45, at 1007. 
265. Id.; see also Steinman, supra note 41, at 320 (“[A] set of rules that allows appellate courts to 
review remands based on technical defects in removal procedure or ordered in the exercise of 
discretion but denies them the ability to review remands based on the fundamental question of federal 
jurisdiction is most peculiar. It is hard to fathom that Congress would have intended such a scheme. 
The system is perverse, and ought to be fixed.” (footnote omitted)). 
266. Steinman, supra note 45, at 1004 (noting consequences of making “discretionary remands of 
pendent state law claims” unreviewable). According to Professor Steinman, the law would be in a 
“problematic state” if discretionary remands of supplemental claims were not reviewable on appeal 
but discretionary dismissals were. Id. She notes that district courts could “dismiss when they welcomed 
appellate review of a ‘hard’ decision,” but “remand when appellate review would accomplish little.” 
Id. at 1005. “In addition, such a system could work less benignly, allowing district judges to avoid 
reversal by remanding.” Id. Furthermore,  
the choice between remand and dismissal often will be driven by statute of limitations or 
other considerations that have no bearing on the value of appellate review in a particular 
case. To the extent that this is true, it is anomalous for remand and dismissal to have 
different appellate consequences.  
Id. 
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In addition, as Professor Dodson has pointed out,267 the classification of 
something as jurisdictional can have costly systemic consequences:  
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction in federal court . . . can be 
raised by any party or the court sua sponte; may not be consented to by 
the parties; are not subject to principles of estoppel, forfeiture, or 
waiver; and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on 
appeal.268  
Thus, jurisdictional defects can be “discovered well into trial” or even on 
appeal and “cause[] disruption, unfairness, and tremendous waste of time and 
resources.”269 
To date, several circuits have concluded that because the decision whether 
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, (1) neither a district court 
nor an appellate court is obligated to raise the applicability of § 1367(c) sua 
sponte, and (2) if the parties fail to raise the issue in the district court they cannot 
raise it on appeal.270 If the Supreme Court decides that Cohill remands (and 
therefore presumably dismissals) are subject matter jurisdictional, then all of the 
attributes and attendant costs of a jurisdictional classification will apply to them. 
The Federal Circuit did not consider these implications of its decision in HIF 
Bio.271 Given the systemic costs of classifying Cohill remands as subject matter 
jurisdictional, however, the Supreme Court should at least take these 
considerations into account.272 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued primarily that Cohill remands are discretionary, not 
subject matter jurisdictional, and therefore are not subject to the appellate 
 
267. Dodson, supra note 41, at 56, 66. 
268. Id. at 56. 
269. Id. at 66 (describing “heavy costs on the litigants and legal system” resulting from 
characterization of something as jurisdictional). 
270. See, e.g., Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Cabanas, 435 F.3d 855, 857 n.2 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that 
where neither party nor the magistrate judge raised issue, court is not required to determine sua 
sponte whether magistrate’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction was abuse of discretion); Int’l Coll. 
of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 356, 366 (7th Cir. 1998) (on remand from Supreme Court) 
(finding that where litigants do not challenge district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over 
supplemental claims under § 1367(c), they cannot raise argument on appeal); Lucero v. Trosch, 121 
F.3d 591, 598 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(en banc) (holding that “when there is power to hear the case under § 1367(a),” district court can 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction “without sua sponte addressing whether it should be declined under 
§ 1367(c)” and appellate court is “not required, sua sponte, to decide whether the district court abused 
its discretion under § 1367(c) when neither party has raised the issue”); Fein ex rel. Doe v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that while court must raise Article III jurisdiction 
sua sponte because it “goes to the foundation of the court’s power to resolve a case,” district court’s 
decision whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(c) is discretionary and therefore, 
absent exceptional circumstances, any objection to district court’s decision to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction is waived if not raised in district court). 
271. See supra notes 249–54 and accompanying text for a discussion of these implications. 
272. Dodson, supra note 41, at 77 (arguing that in deciding whether to characterize removal 
provision as jurisdictional or procedural, courts should “consider a wide range of implications”). 
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review bar created by § 1447(c) and (d) and Supreme Court precedent. To 
conclude that Cohill remands are reviewable on appeal, however, does not mean 
that Cohill remands should be reviewable on appeal. According to the Supreme 
Court, the goal of § 1447(d) is to avoid litigation about which of two competent 
court systems will try remanded claims.273 Thus, the conclusion that Cohill 
remands are unreviewable on appeal would serve the purpose of § 1447(d) in any 
case where there was no question about whether a state court was competent to 
try the remanded claims. 
Assuming that the goal of decreasing litigation over “nonmerits” issues is 
worthwhile, the question becomes how best to achieve it. The first option is for 
the Court and Congress to maintain the status quo. As things stand now, the 
Court has insisted that § 1447(c) and (d) must be read together and Congress has 
not indicated that it disapproves of the Court’s interpretation of the statutes. If 
Thermtron and its progeny (from both the Supreme Court and the lower courts) 
are any indication, however, the status quo has not accomplished the goal of 
limiting “nonmerits” litigation.274 A second option is for the Court to read § 
1447(d) as it was written, and allow appellate review of remands only in civil 
rights cases or in other cases where Congress has specifically provided for 
review. This approach would reduce litigation, but of course Thermtron and its 
progeny stand squarely in the way of this option. A third option would be for 
Congress to redraft § 1447(d) and clarify the types of remands that fall within the 
appellate review bar. The problem with this option, however, is that the 
redrafting of statutes often leads to litigation and even the relatively clear 
language of the current version of § 1447(d) did not prevent the Court from 
interpreting it contrary to its plain language. 
A fourth option is for Congress to repeal § 1447(d) and permit appellate 
review of remand orders without restriction. This approach obviously would 
generate litigation, but it would also end litigation over whether a particular 
remand order falls within § 1447(c) and (d). The resources that litigants and the 
courts now expend on litigating whether a remand order is reviewable could be 
spent on litigating the merits of the remand. This approach would also end the 
anomalies created by the Court’s current approach, such as permitting the 
review of discretionary remands but banning the review of jurisdictional 
remands. In addition, regardless of whether a claim was dismissed or remanded, 
the availability of appeal and the level of review would be the same for all 
litigants. Thus, although the repeal of § 1447(d) might result in a net increase in 
litigation, it could also result in a better use of judicial and litigant resources and 
promote fairness. For these reasons, Congress should consider repealing § 
1447(d). 
In the meantime, however, the Supreme Court should not conclude that 
Cohill remands are subject matter jurisdictional and therefore cannot be 
reviewed on appeal in order to reduce litigation over where the claims will be 
 
273. See supra note 121 and accompanying text for the Powerex Court’s reasoning. 
274. See supra Part II.B for a discussion of this doctrinal line. 
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tried. Instead, the Court should reverse the Federal Circuit and hold that Cohill 
remands are not subject matter jurisdictional for purposes of § 1447(c) and (d). 
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